Mark The closure procedure may be initiated by a
court, by a company in voluntary proceedings
initiated by a resolution at a general meeting, or by
creditors under court supervision. Initiated by a trial
court begins with the submission of a petition by
interested parties. Courts control closures under this
system, appoint Authorized Recipients as temporary
liquidators, and may appoint inspection committees.
On the other hand, a company-initiated bankruptcy is
controlled by a member who appoints a liquidator.
There were no creditors or inspection committee
meetings. However, creditor rights under voluntary
closure are largely similar to those of creditors in the
closure rules, and mandatory bankruptcy evidence
governing and debt priority apply equally to both
situations.
Shon Gadgil (2019), the reason for selecting the
comparison of insolvency laws between India and
that of the United Kingdom and Singapore is because
these countries follow the common law system. The
Law of Insolvency in fact, originates in the United
Kingdom, because the concept of the limited liability
company structure originated here. India and
Singapore both follow the common law structure,
largely due to the fact that they both are also
Commonwealth countries. However, despite
following the same system, there is a long way to go
for India in terms of its ‘Insolvency Resolution’. As
per the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, India
ranks at 108 in its Insolvency Resolution, while
Singapore ranks at 27 and the United Kingdom ranks
at. All the above-mentioned countries are at different
stages of reforms in their respective insolvency laws.
The United Kingdom has already undertaken two
rounds of significant reforms, the first one in 1986
based on the Cork Committee report of 1982. The
second reform was in 2002. In Singapore, the
Insolvency Law Reform Committee (ILRC), which
was set up in 2010, submitted its recommendations in
2013. India initiated its major reform in 2014, when
the Ministry of Finance constituted the BLRC.
3 years since the passing of this legislation, this
paper seeks to analyze the effectiveness of the code in
comparison to its common law counterparts, UK and
Singapore with special emphasis on the timeliness of
the resolution of cases under the Code. The analysis
is in two parts. The first section compares the
legislative provisions of the countries in order to
identify fields of operation that effect the timeliness
of the resolution proceedings. Secondly, once the
legislative the question that is to be answered is
whether passing of the Code has actually lead to faster
insolvency resolution procedures. But as Ravi points
out in her article, there has been few empirical studies
in India in the area of insolvency law and practice as
she explores the judicial innovations and weak
institutions that have lead to tremendous delays in the
resolution of cases under the earlier Code
Fortunately for foreign creditors in Singapore, the
English-based conflict system generally has an effect
on foreign bankruptcy decisions, and Singapore itself
recognizes this principle in law. Law enforcement
under this Act is achieved by court registration on
application by assessment creditors. While the law
does not require strict reciprocity, it demands
substantially the same recognition of the Singapore
ruling if foreign court decisions are to be made
recognized in Singapore.
According to Mark Gross (2000), Singapore
courts will recognize liquidator authorities appointed
under the law of place of incorporation to act on
behalf of the PT corporation. The reason for this rule
is that the existence and dissolution of entities which
have been legally created under the laws of a foreign
country must be regulated by that law. The question
is, to what extent will the court acknowledge the
verdict of the bankrupt property from jurisdictions
other than the establishment of the company. The
reasons for granting such recognition are that the
business activities of foreign companies may be
widespread or more substantial elsewhere, or the
place where the incorporation may be just
coincidence or an attempt to take advantage of the
law.
Singapore’s international insolvency law is
underdeveloped and out of sync with current
international norms, at least with regards to those
countries that have adopted one or more international
or regional measures promoting co-operation and co-
ordination in international insolvencies. The main
reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs is that s
377(3)(c) provides for ring-fencing. A subsidiary
reason is that whilst some of Singapore’s most
important trading partners and sources and
destinations of investments have enacted the Model
Law or are members of regional initiatives such as the
EC Regulation, we have neither adopted the Model
Law nor ratified any convention or treaty on
international insolvency. To a certain extent, this
problem may beameliorated if the ring-fencing in s
377(3)(c) is removed and our courts accept
universalism as the guiding principle. It is, however,
not a substitute for adopting the Model Law.
Tay Yong Seng & Jonathan Chan Tuan San
(2016), when businesses fail, it is not unheard of for
businesspersons to abscond from the jurisdiction or to
hide behind corporate vehicles, leaving debts
unsatisfied. This article is concerned with the reach of