A Commons-compatible Implementation of the Sharing Economy:

Blockchain-based Open Source Mediation

Petra Unterberger

, Manfred Mayr

, Maximilian Tschuchnig

and Peter Haber

Business Development & Economics, Salzburg University of Applied Sciences, Puch/Salzburg, Austria

Business Informatics, Salzburg University of Applied Sciences, Puch/Salzburg, Austria

Information Technology & Systems Management, Salzburg University of Applied Sciences, Puch/Salzburg, Austria

Keywords: Sharing Economy, Blockchain, Commons, Platform Economy, Network Economy.

Abstract: The network economical sharing economy, with direct exchange as a core characteristic, is implemented both,

on a commons and platform economical basis. This is due to a gain in importance of trust, collaborative

consumption and democratic management as well as technological progress, in the form of near zero marginal

costs, open source contributions and digital transformation. Concurrent to these commons-based drivers, the

grey area between commerce and private exchange is used to exploit work, safety and tax regulations by

central platform economists. Instead of central intermediators, the blockchain technology makes decentralized

consensus finding, using Proof-of-Work (PoW) within a self-sustaining Peer-to-Peer network, possible.

Therefore, a blockchain-based open source mediation seems to offer a commons-compatible implementation

of the sharing economy. This thesis is investigated through a qualitative case study of Sardex and Interlace

with their blockchain application, based on expert interviews and a structured content analysis. To detect the

most commons-compatible implementation, the different implementation options through conventional

platform intermediators, an open source blockchain with PoW as well as Interlaces’ permissioned blockchain

approach, are compared. The following confrontation is based on deductive criteria, which illustrates the

inherent characteristics of a commons-based sharing economy.

1 INTRODUCTION

The sharing economy has gained increasing social

acceptance, driven by socio-ecological, economic

and technological changes (Botsman 2013, online). It

has the potential for more sustainable business using

digital transformation (Baier et al. 2016, 23-29) by

shifting emphasis on open networks (Benkler 2006,

4-5), trust and more efficient resource usage (Siefkes

2016, 50, Baier et al. 2016, 35-38).

However, the practice of the sharing economy by

conventional platform providers shows an

intensification of capitalism. In a grey area between

market and state regulation (Sundararajan 2016, 3,

26-27) platform providers enrich themselves

(Reillier, Reillier 2017, 2), without assuming

responsibility for safety or local regulations (Slee

2015, 49-53; Martin 2016, 153).

To ensure that the potential for more sustainable

business is not lost in the platform economy, a

commons suitable implementation must be found

(Klapper, Martin, Upham 2017, 1395). For this

purpose, this paper examines a blockchain-based

open source Peer-to-Peer (P2P) mediation, which

enables direct interaction of peers on the basis of

democracy and self-preservation (Nakamoto 2008, 1-

3). The corporation Sardex in cooperation with the

EU-research project Interlace offers a complementary

market based on a blockchain application. Due to

them taking responsibility for social and local issues,

they are used as case study in this paper.

The main contributions of this paper are to

investigate the implementation compatibility of a

commons-based sharing economy through a

blockchain-based open source mediation and to

identify deductive criteria, which illustrate the

inherent characteristics of such a commons-based

sharing model. Therefore, the network economic

context of the sharing economy with its sociological

and technological drivers is analysed and the different

implementation options through conventional

platform intermediators, a blockchain with PoW and

Interlaces´ permissioned blockchain approach are

compared in regard to their commons-compatibility.

Unterberger, P., Mayr, M., Tschuchnig, M. and Haber, P.

A Commons-compatible Implementation of the Sharing Economy: Blockchain-based Open Source Mediation.

DOI: 10.5220/0009345600720079

In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Finance, Economics, Management and IT Business (FEMIB 2020), pages 72-79

ISBN: 978-989-758-422-0

2 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

Extensive debates in different contexts lead to various

research focuses and interpretations of the sharing

economy. This contribution focusses on high impact

sharing economy concepts and divides them into a

commons and a platform-based sharing economy.

2.1 Related Work

The main bulk of sharing economy research is

focused on network economic concepts and business

models, while other researchers predict fundamental

changes in economic paradigms.

Sundararajan (2016), Evan and Schmalensee

(2016) as well as Reillier and Reillier (2017) analyze

the usage of network effects within the sharing

economy and which business models can be derived

from it. Tirole (2017) delves towards technical issues

of two-sided platforms, concerning the

transformation of business, work and regulation.

Botsman (2013) recognizes technological, social,

ecological and economic drivers of the sharing

economy and that its success is based on convenience,

transparency and participation.

Benkler (2006) predicts a revolution of our

economic paradigm through cooperation and

allocation of information goods to marginal costs,

close to zero. Rifkin (2014) expands upon this

concept by digital transformation and the inclusion of

the communication, energy and logistics

infrastructure, resulting in disappearing marginal

costs, also for tangible goods.

Driven by cultural changes at the beginning,

Bardhi and Eckhard (2012) investigate the shift from

ownership to access and ascertain, that sharing

economy is motivated by cost-effectiveness and

convenience (2015). Siefkes (2016) criticizes that,

while social welfare improvements can be realized

through responsible usage of technology in the sense

of Ostroms commons, negative effects on the labor

market and contradictions of fundamental cost-cuts

by investment-intensive goods will arise.

Sharing economy as a pure intensification of the

capitalistic system is represented by Slee (2015). Non

abidance of laws, profit maximization of individuals

and exploitation of communities in combination with

exponential growth are challenging social states.

This paper builds on the introduced work as well

as the academic work “Eine Commons-gerechte

Umsetzung der Sharing Economy” (Unterberger

2019) to investigate a commons-compatible

implementation of the sharing economy.

2.2 Terminology - Sharing and

Network Economy

The sharing economy is positioned between market and

state planning by using the decentral internet structure.

It enables the direct exchange (Rifkin 2014, 342; Slee

2015, 9) of unused digital and physical resources

(Botsman 2013, online) between members of digital

communities on a high scale (Sundararajan 2016, 38)

(Table 1, S1.1, S3.4). Commons of the sharing economy

are characterized by non-exclusion (Moglen 1999, 21-

22; Benkler 2006, 61-63) and decreasing rivalry in

consumption (Merten, Meretz 2005, 305-309). Their

purpose is to sustain members with useful goods.

Revenues and costs from usage and contribution are

generated and allocated democratically and self-

governing within the community (Ostrom 1999, 116-

118; Siefkes 2016, 51-52) (Table 1, S2.3, S3.1 and

S3.4). In comparison, the platform economy is market

based and capitalistic, organized via crowd-based

networks (Parker, Van Alstyne, Choudary 2016, 15).

Thus it enters a grey area between private and business

exchange (Sundararajan 2016, 26-27).

Due to the core of the sharing economy being its

decentralized character, it is dominated by the

network economy (Evans, Schmalensee 2016, 21).

Two-sided markets, where sellers and customers can

interact with each other, aim to use positive, indirect

network effects, which attract new members on the

supply as well as on the demand side and avoid

negative externalities (Parker, Van Alstyne,

Choudary 2016, 29-31, Tirole 2017, 379-387),

resulting in a positive feedback loop. Such demand

based economies of scale are responsible for the

disproportionate growth of successful sharing models

(Shapiro, Varian 1999, 174) (Table 1, T1).

3 DRIVERS OF A

COMMONS-BASED SHARING

ECONOMY

Social change and technical innovations depend on

each other. In order to keep the focus on these two

drivers of the sharing economy, ecological and

economical aspects are not explicitly discussed. The

sharing economy was developed as a niche in

different areas of life, evolved to bring regimes into

question with its social values, culture and economic

paradigm (Martin 2016, 149-150, 158; Baier et al.

2016), as well as close to zero marginal costs, open

source software and digital transformation (Benkler

2006, 52; Rifkin 2014, 107).

A Commons-compatible Implementation of the Sharing Economy: Blockchain-based Open Source Mediation

3.1 Sociological Drivers

The commons-based sharing economy empowers

peers worldwide to create, share and develop

together. This exchange is based on trust and social

capital (Cherry, Pidgeon 2018, 939-940), which is

primarily generated by decentralized reputation

systems and photographs (Ert, Fleischer, Magen

2016, 63) (Table 1, S4.1, S4.2 and S4.4).

Moreover, a cultural shift can be recognized from

ownership, which loses its status function, to access,

which enable flexibility for a rapidly changing,

dematerialized society (Baradhi, Eckhardt 2012,

883). This is shown by collaborative consumption,

where time, resources or skills are shared and

exchanged directly between peers (Rifktin 2014, 329-

330) (Table 1, S4.3 and T4.3).

Even the economic paradigm is challenged by the

emergence of the democratic and self-organized

commons-based sharing economy. Commons realize

their maximum value due to non-exclusion and self-

management (Rose 1986, 774, 779-781). According

to Ostrom (1999, 116-118) this requires certain rules

which can be adapted to global peer production. Key

roles are the consideration of local circumstances,

direct democracy, transparent structures and

governmental recognition (Benkler 2006, 3, 275)

(Table 1, S1, T2.3, S3.2, S3.3 and S4.2).

However, within the platform economy,

contributions are not shared, but made available by

micro-entrepreneurs for an untaxed fee (Martin 2016,

153) with reputation systems being criticized to be

inadequate in replacing safety or hygiene regulations

(Slee 2015, 117-130). Moreover, platform

economists use access for cost efficiency as well as

convenience and apply government regulations to

their own benefit (Bardhi, Eckardt 2015, online),

while owners can arbitrarily decide which peers they

grant access (Slee 2015, 49). This is highlighted by

Hardin (1968), who in comparison to Ostrom (1968,

1244-1248) assumes the failure of commons in the

long term, since humans primarily pursue their

individual benefits. Additionally, users have no say or

control but have to bear the risk of breaches of

agreements or laws (Slee 2015, 52-53; Klapper,

Martin, Upham 2017, 1395).

3.2 Technological Drivers

Information goods are the basis of the sharing

economy and can already be produced and distributed

at almost zero marginal costs, which describes

optimal productivity (Rifkin 2014, 12-14, 18),

devolving power from resource scarcity and making

human communication capacity the key resource

(Benker 2006, 52) (Table 1, T1.1 and T4.4).

Table 1: Categorization of commons-based sharing economy variables (Interpretation of the introduced sociological and

technological drivers).

S Sociological T Technological

1 Economic

Focus

S1.1 Positioning between market and state –

Combination of value creation and sharing

T1.1 Two-sided networks – Demand-based economies of

scale, Positive externalities

S1.2 Self-management T1.2 P2P networks

S1.3 Democracy

T1.3 Distributed Platform

2 Users and

Resources

S2.1 Distinction of users and resources T2.1 Open source license

S2.2 Control of users and resources – Simple conflict

resolution mechanisms

T2.2 Traceability and transparency – Reputation systems

and safety standards

S2.3 Economic commons – Goods and services,

reducing rivalry

T2.3 Digital commons – Digitalization of goods and

services, marginal costs near zero

3 Institutional

Rules

S3.1 Allocation and acquisition T3.1 Transaction flow

S3.2 Coherence with local conditions T3.2 Differentiation of local and global networks

S3.3 Recognition of the state T3.3 Legal compliance

S3.4 Supply of stakeholders – Unused resources

T3.4 Availability

4 Social Values

S4.1 Social capital – Sociological trust T4.1 Social welfare – Technological trust

S4.2 Access – Non-exclusion, sharing T4.2 Open source software

S4.3 Collaborative consumption T4.3 Direct P2P exchange

S4.4 Social interaction T4.4 Communication capacity as key resource

FEMIB 2020 - 2nd International Conference on Finance, Economics, Management and IT Business

Open source software for example can be

developed in modules from peers (Benkler 2006, 64-

66), with GPL licensing e.g. ensuring that everyone

has the freedom to use and develop software and that

the results are subject to the same requirements

(Stallmann 2015, 3). (Table 1, T2.1, T4.1 and T4.2).

The technological drivers of the sharing economy

are based on the transformation of these advantages

from the digital to the physical world. The combined

use of the internet, apps, artificial intelligence,

additive manufacturing and blockchains enables P2P

exchange in real time at low transaction costs. The

Internet of Things (IoT) can coordinate the

communication, energy and logistics infrastructure

thus also reducing marginal costs of physical goods

drastically for them to become freely accessible

(Rifkin 2014, 30, 36, 105-107). A free, social and

highly efficient commons-based sharing economy,

can replace capitalism on a large scale by turning

technical progress to social progress (Rifkin 2014,

22-24) (Table 1, T2.3 and T3.4)

Nevertheless, the increase in productivity via

automation not only leads to cheaper products, but

also a high level of unemployment. Capitalism is

largely maintained by monopolies and the marginal

cost theory cannot be applied to physical goods with

high fixed costs (Siefkes 2016, 40, 45-50). On the one

hand, open source software and content aims to

ensure freedom and social welfare. On the other hand,

property rights of developers and artists are violated

by illegal pirated copies (Gates 1976, online). Also,

since platform economy has its focus on profit

maximization (Slee 2015, 184-186), it might lead to a

surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2015, 75-76, 85).

4 BLOCKCHAIN-BASED

MEDIATION

In addition to apps, social networks and the IoT,

blockchains are technological innovations with high

impact, as they can help to realize a commons-based

sharing economy without the abuse of platform

providers. This is because the blockchain, with its

inherent P2P-structure and democratic behaviour,

seems to be in line with the sociological and

technological drivers discussed in chapter 3.

4.1 Blockchain – Definition

A blockchain is a decentralized database of single

data blocks that contain transactions. Each block

consists of the hash of the previous block,

unconsolidated transactions and a number used once.

The resulting chain displays transactional historical

correctness, which can be verified through the

cryptographically secure connecting hashes

(Nakamoto 2008, 3-4; Hughes et al. 2018, 64).

In order to ensure open access and control, the

decentralized structure must meet the requirements of

consensus finding without a central instance and self-

preservation (Swan 2015, 1). PoW enables this

through the solution of a mathematical problem

which correctness is verified by a majority. This

approval is reflected by the integration of the solved

data block and processing of the next block. If several

blocks are sent for verification, the block accepted by

the majority is preferred (Nakamoto 2008, 1, 3,

Nofer, Gomber, Hinz 2017, 184), resulting in a voting

process similar to direct democracy. This complex

processing requires computing power, which is

provided by so called miners, which are usually

compensated for their service in e.g. crypto currencies

(Swan 2015, 16).

4.2 Pro and Cons of a Blockchain

The decisive advantage of a blockchain is its

decentralization and digitalization, which enables

peers to exchange transactions directly (Husain,

Roep, Franklin 2019, 6). Therefore, trust in

intermediaries, such as platform providers becomes

obsolete (Swan 2015, 17). Both, users and miners in

a blockchain can act anonymously. However, studies

illustrate that network analysis can identify user

groups (Sixt 2017, 32-33). Maximum transparency is

provided by the historical database, which can be

monitored and has to be stored by all peers (Koch,

Pieters 2017, 2). It is traceable and immutable due to

PoW (Nakamoto 2008, 3), as long as not more than

50% of peers agree on adding a false block. The

distributed data store and an increasing number of

network nodes lead to scaling problems in the long

term (Barber et al. 2012, 410).

Therefore, the blockchain technology is suitable

to help a commons-based sharing economy to break

through, as central platform providers are no longer

needed, due to decisions and maintenance of the

platform being directly managed by the peers at near

zero marginal cost. Trust is replaced by a

mathematical algorithm and anonymity makes human

interaction obsolete. However, legal, energy and

scaling problems must be taken into account when

using blockchains as a platform for sharing economy.

A Commons-compatible Implementation of the Sharing Economy: Blockchain-based Open Source Mediation

5 EVALUATING THE

COMMONS-COMPATIBILITY

OF A BLOCKCHAIN

APPROACH

In order to investigate, if a commons-compatible

implementation of the sharing economy is possible

using blockchain technology, a qualitative case study

is performed. Therefore, Sardex in cooperation with

Interlace and its blockchain application are empirical

evaluated.

5.1 Methodology – Qualitative Case

Study

A structured content analysis according to Mayring

(2015) is used as qualitative evaluation method due to

the novelty of the issue and therefore needed open,

explorative access and consideration of the social

context.

Therefore, the company Sardex S.p.A. in

cooperation with the Horizon 2020, EU-research

project Interlace (No. 794494) and their blockchain

application are selected for a case study. Qualitative

data material, such as expert interviews with P. Dini

(2019) and E. Hirsch (2019) as well as the whole

Sardex and Interlace consortium are analysed. The

two academic experts have objective, specialized

key-knowledge, due to their research, consulting and

control functions within Sardex and Interlace.

The case is evaluated based on criteria for a

commons-based implementation of the sharing

economy. These criteria, which can be seen in Table

1, are derived from the drivers and the definitions of

a commons-based sharing economy and expanded

trough the evaluation of the Sardex and Interlace case

study. The variables are structured via deduction of

terms regarding intention and extension (Tatievskaya

2005, 53-54) and illustrated in a multidimensional

category system. Due to strong relations between

sociological and technological criteria, they are

analysed in reference to each other and further form

four main rubrics. The category “Economic Focus”

deals with its economic position, management and

maintenance issues. “Users and Resources” includes

the necessary characteristics of participants, goods

and services regarding their commons-compatibility.

How these users get in touch and deal with each other

as well as how these resources are allocated and

acquisitioned is defined within “Institutional rules”.

Issues regarding interaction and allocation beyond

institutional rules with the focus on trust and sharing

in the sense of commons are discussed within “Social

values”. The rehashed data is analysed, assigned to

the appropriate variables and evaluated with a

qualitative content analysis.

5.2 Sharing Economy by Sardex and

Interlace

This section evaluates the realization of the sharing

economy by Sardex in cooperation with Interlace and

its blockchain application empirical in reference to

the deductive commons-based criteria.

Under an economic focus, Sardex offers a

complementary market based on mutual credits, trust,

goods and services with a virtual network as a key

resource. Through the Interlace blockchain, interest

free loans become traceable and scale to other regions

with almost zero transaction costs (Dini et al. D2.2

2018, 13-15; Dini, Hirsch 2018, D3.2, 12). Each peer

can submit or reject each transaction, copy the entire

chain and disconnect from the system at any time

(Hirsch 2019, 8-11). Sardex ensures distributed

control, but does not implement a completely open

blockchain to pursue social values and the monetary

interests of investors (Dini 2019, 2, 6-7) (Table 1,

T3.2).

Users and resources are controlled central by

Sardex. Registered companies are distinguished

based on their communication and economic as well

as financial interaction possibilities (Dini et al. D3.1

2018, 9-12).

Institutional rules define the allocation and

acquisition of mutual loans within Sardex. They are

provided on the basis of real economic potential (Dini

2019, 9) and implemented via smart contracts. (Dini

et al. D3.1 2018, 7-8). A balance between local and

global requirements is technologically supported

through distinction of a community, application and

infrastructure Layer. Legally prescribed taxes and

rules are paid directly and observed (Dini et al. D2.3

2018, 8). (Table 1, S2.1, S2.3, S3.3, T3.3 and T3,5).

Sardex and Interlace focus on social values, which

are based on ethical considerations and implemented

through judgmental technology. The foundation of

Sardex is sociologically and technologically trust.

Furthermore, it prioritizes solidarity, local culture and

mutuality, which are implemented through controlled

technology by Interlace (Dini et al. D2.3 2018, 10-12;

Dini 2019, 11-12) which is open and free of charge

for copies, modifications, extensions and publications

to everyone (Dini D1.1 2017, 4-5) (Table1, S4.1 and

T4.1).

FEMIB 2020 - 2nd International Conference on Finance, Economics, Management and IT Business

6 FINDINGS –

BLOCKCHAIN-BASED

MEDIATION

This section compares Sardex in cooperation with

Interlace in regard to the theoretically derived criteria,

crucial for a commons-based sharing economy, with

the possibilities of a permissionless blockchain as

well as a typical platform economic system to get the

most compatible one. To which extend a blockchain-

based open source mediation enables a commons-

compatible practice, is answered by linking the

introduced theory to empiricism.

Economic focus: A permissionless blockchain,

Sardex with Interlace and traditional sharing

platforms, each generate value by providing peers the

ability to transact directly with each other in almost

real time. While a permissionless blockchain offers

this completely distributed, Sardex provides this via a

complementary market with mutual credits and

platform economy in a capitalistic grey area between

commerce and private business. While peers manage

and maintain the permissionless blockchain by

themselves, central intermediaries charge high

commissions. The centrally managed Sardex, e.g.

collects an annual membership fee for maintaining

the technological infrastructure (Dini, Hirsch 2018,

D3.2, 41). An open blockchain with PoW is governed

democratically, while neither platform providers nor

Interlace can make majority decisions.

Users and Resources: The inclusivity of a

permissionless blockchain also comes with problems,

since it is unable to exclude peers and traded content

is uncontrollable. In contrast, Sardex gives its

participants access to interest-free credit while

supporting social interaction. Platform sharing

models usually give strangers access without social

interaction or respect to the needs of the commune.

Institutional Rules: Control in blockchains is

completely distributed and trust is replaced by

algorithms, whereas trade in the platform economy is

based on P2P rating systems. While Sardex complies

with all laws as well as tax regulations and is

recognized by the state and international authorities,

a permissionless blockchain only implements

regulations that are passed by the majority of peers.

In contrast, platform intermediators try to shift the

responsibility for law-abiding or transparent

transactions to its peers.

Social Values: Blockchains with their own

currencies in tokens tend to be subject to speculation.

In contrast, Sardex with Interlace offers trade on basis

of actual economic potential by maximal

transparency. Nakamoto (2008), with his publication

of the blockchain through Bitcoin, makes trust in

intermediaries obsolete and revolutionizes P2P

exchange, while Sardex is based on trust and takes

supra-regional rules and local culture into account. In

contrast, traditional sharing platforms have no regard

for the needs of the commune.

The compatibility of a commons-based

implementation of the sharing economy through

blockchain-based open source mediation varies

between different criteria. While it meets the variables

concerning the economic focus best and is compatible

with most of the institutional rules, social values suffer

under the direct democracy and inclusivity, which

leads to issues regarding self-serving users, who

exploit the system for trading e.g. illegal resources.

This shows that a blockchain based open source

mediation on itself is incompatible with a commons-

based implementation of the sharing economy.

7 RECOMMENDED

COMMONS-COMPATIBLE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

SHARING ECONOMY

Based on the findings in chapter 6 and under the

prevailing conditions, that individuals act

opportunistic within a capitalistic system, a

combination of a permissionless blockchain and a

publicly voted central system is recommended. This

results in a suitable technology that ensures

traceability, distributed control and takes local and

social considerations into account.

While consensus building through PoW can be

used to participate in a direct democratic way

regarding commons investments and mediation, an

elected group of stakeholders can take responsibility

for law-abidance and commons compatibility, like

representative democracy. Thus, decentralised

majority voting is used to integrate peers into the

administration and to make them aware of their

responsibility towards society. To enable mutual

allocation and acquisition of tangible commons, such

as 3D printers or solar panels, they can be financed by

investing a percentage of the transaction volume in

order to aid most members. Further, such mutual and

effective collaboration enables investments in state-

of-the-art technology. This aims to attract more users

and lead to positive, indirect network effects. The

group of representatives are also elected by the

majority and financed by fees, which are

automatically paid by transactions. The amount of fee

A Commons-compatible Implementation of the Sharing Economy: Blockchain-based Open Source Mediation

is determined by the members democratically and can

be checked in the historical database.

In summary, a commons-compatible

implementation of the sharing economy is possible by

combining a permissionless blockchain-based open

source software with a publicly voted central system.

While PoW enables majority voting, distributed

control and transparency, a group of local

stakeholders are able to take responsibility of laws

and cultures in the sense of commons.

8 CONCLUSIONS

This paper deals with the drivers of the network

economical commons-based sharing economy and

investigates the various compatibilities by comparing

different implementations through conventional

platform intermediators, an open source blockchain

with PoW and the permissioned blockchain of Sardex

in cooperation with Interlace in regard to commons-

characteristic criteria. Based on that confrontation,

the compatibility of a commons-based

implementation of the sharing economy through a

blockchain-based open source mediation is explored.

To summarize, network effects enable rapid

development of both, commons-based and platform

economic sharing economy. Blockchain technology,

with its decentralized, historical database and

consensual finding with PoW seems to have potential

for a commons-compatible implementation of the

sharing economy. However, the single case study of

Sardex in cooperation with Interlace and their

blockchain application illustrates, that in practice the

distributed, permissionless blockchain only does this to

a limited extend. This neutral technology realizes

democracy and independence from intermediators.

Therefore, it is subject to the will of the majority, who

prefer monetary benefit maximization under

anonymity. In comparison, a permissioned blockchain,

used for distributed control and transparency, supports

a more commons-compatible implementation, as long

as the central authority takes social responsibility.

Most contradictions result from the implementation of

a commons-based sharing economy through platform

economy, but even the adapted blockchain application

cannot meet all commons criteria, as the evaluation of

the paper shows. Therefore, a combination of a

permissionless blockchain-based open source

mediation with a publicly voted central system is

recommended for a commons-compatible

implementation of a sharing economy based on

transparency, democracy and taking supra regional as

well as local social needs into account.

The conclusion, that direct democratic technology

fulfils most of the economic and institutional

requirements, but does not lead to a commons-based

trade, has consequences. It results that a commons-

compatible implementation is not advantageous for

majority of peers, or that they are unable to estimate

the long-term effects of current decisions, thereby

reaching limits of direct democracy. Both, this

recognition as well as the prognosis that the platform

economy will continue within our capitalistic system,

makes further research obvious. This includes the

analysis of the effects of progressive automation on

the labour market as well as the consequences of

permanent data collection and use within capitalism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We thank Hermann Rauchenschwandtner, FH-Prof.

Dr. Dr., Salzburg University of Applied Sciences,

who provided insight and expertise that greatly

assisted the research.

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