actors/officials/agencies directing at restricting the
free practice of religion (Grim & Finke, 2006; Mataic,
2018). This study follows Jonathan Fox’s specific and
narrowed definition of government religious-based
discrimination (GRD), which refers to “restrictions
placed by governments or their agents on the
religious practices or institutions of religious
minorities that are not placed on the majority
religion” (Fox, 2016, 2020)
According to Fox, this definition of GRD
distinguishes discrimination from religious
restrictions. As he puts it, “while religious repression
may apply to all religions and can be substantial and
violate the right to free exercise of all citizens
(including majority religion), religious
discrimination only applies to minority groups and
manifest in an unequal state’s support between
majority and minority religions” (Fox, 2020)
According to Fox (2020), there are various form
of governmental restrictions, ranging from legal to
political and security approach. Yet the pattern of
GRD can be classified into four categories of
restrictions. First, restriction on religious practices,
which targets public and private observance of
religion, religious laws, or religious groups; materials
related religious teachings, rites, and ceremonies; and
the practice of religious laws and customs. Second,
restriction on religious institutions and clergy, which
includes access to religious registration, places of
worship, religious clergy, or even public facilities.
Third, restriction on conversion and proselytizing,
including conversion or renunciation of faith, and
proselytizing of religious teachings. Last, other types
of restrictions, such as laws and policies on
mandatory education in the majority religion; child
custody based on religion; state surveillance of
religious activities, groups, or perceived heretic sects;
or state’s negligence to protect religious minorities.
While much of the research use human rights
perspective as analytical framework to explain why
and how discrimination against minority religions is
ubiquitous, they overlook why government
discriminate against certain minority groups. Against
this backdrop, this study looks into the explanation of
civic space theory. Developed out of democratization
literature, this theory provides a general
understanding of how the state and society compete
for civic space and explains why this situation occurs
and likely to be profound.
In the mainstream literatures, the concept of civic
space is often understood as central to “any open and
democratic society and means that states have a duty
to protect people while respecting and facilitating the
basic fundamental rights to associate, assemble
peacefully, and express views of opinion” (Civicus,
2011). Following this definition, freedom of religion,
which is recognized as one of the fundamental civil
rights, is therefore closely related to civic space.
The civic space is open when all religious groups
have equal freedom to embrace and practice their
beliefs: individually and collectively; privately and
publicly. Conversely, when the state fails to protect
this freedom, or deliberately limits religious freedom
that should be enjoyed by all religious groups equally,
this will cause this space to shrink, or even closed.
Although in reality, this situation in which religious
freedom is shrinking is not new. As some study
shows, the trend of shrinking religious freedom and
civic space is actually making headlines around the
world, including in Indonesia (Pew Forum, 2019;
Hurriyah, 2020a, 2020b).
When studying the extent of civic space, it should
be emphasised that this is not solely dependent on
external pressures exerted upon it. As Buyse (2018)
asserts, this space is dynamics, never static nor given,
and is created in the interactions between citizens and
civil society elements and others. They are its main
formal and collective manifestation, and they actively
shape civic space but are also dependent on it. In this
regard, Buyse offers a more specific and narrow
definition of civic space, as “the practical room for
action and manoeuvre for citizens and civil society
organizations (CSOs), and the extent to which they
can enjoy the freedoms of association, peaceful
assembly and expression.”
According to Buyse, how a CSO’s activity is
perceived and reacted upon civic space may vary
between the domestic and international level and also
within a country, depending on the state’s level of
effective control over an area or on the state
institution involved. This is because the civic space
consists of and determined by three factors: first,
existing institutional channels, including laws and
procedures and the possibilities for contestation they
offer. In this regard, the state and civil society may
compete in using legal means and mechanism: with
the state employs administrative and criminal law to
suppress the work of CSOs and citizens; and the
citizens or CSOs take legal actions to advocate
themselves. Second, discourse and the power to label
and frame, by which the state uses derogatory
terminology aims to deter criticism, discourage free
expression, increase negative public opinion, and
justify the repression; and the civil society respond
with counter-narratives. Third, the capacity to
maintain and create new space, which includes the
use of ppressures from state actors or private sectors
using carrot-and-stick strategy; and the dynamic of