Company Size, Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance with Audit
Quality as Moderate and Independent Variables
Silviana Wagiu, Armanto Witjaksono and Meiryani
Accounting Department, Faculty of Economics and Communication, Bina Nusantara University, Jakarta, Indonesia
Keywords: Company Size, Institutional Ownership, Tax Avoidance, Audit Quality.
Abstract: This study aims to prove the relationship between profitability, firm size, institutional ownership, and audit
quality on tax avoidance, as well as whether audit quality can moderate the above variables. The research
methods and object used is quantitative research with secondary data in the mining and service sectors listed
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2015-2020 period. The empirical results prove that the factors that
have a significant positive effect on tax avoidance are firm size and institutional ownership, while profitability
and audit quality have a positive but not significant effect on tax avoidance. Audit quality proved insignificant
in moderating the effects of the above variables.
1 INTRODUCTION
Tax revenue plays a very important role in financing
state expenditures. The majority of state spending is
financed by tax revenue. Based on data taken from the
2017-2019 APBN, it was found that the average
contribution from tax revenues to state revenues was
84%, and the contribution from non-tax revenues was
16%. The facts found during the 2017-2019 period
provide information that tax revenue plays an
important role in contributing to state expenditure
financing.
It was also found that the level of realization of
tax revenues never fully reached each period.
Attributed to a high level of tax avoidance by
taxpayers. Tax revenues that are not maximized will
hamper the realization of the budget needed for
development of the nation. Quoted from the cash
website, the Director-General of Taxes of the
Ministry of Finance (Kemenkeu) Suryo Utomo spoke
about the findings of tax avoidance or tax avoidance
which is estimated to cost the state up to Rp 68.7
trillion per year. The findings announced by the Tax
Justice Network reported that due to tax evasion,
Indonesia is estimated to lose up to US$ 4.86 billion
per year. This figure is equivalent to that of the Rp.
68.7 trillion when using the rupiah exchange rate at
the close to the spot market on Monday (23/11) of Rp.
14,149 per the United States (US) dollar (Santoso,
2020). Taxpayer’s tax non-compliance is tax
avoidance, which is an effort to legally reduce the tax
burden that does not violate tax regulations by
taxpayers by trying to reduce the amount of tax owed
by looking for regulatory weaknesses (loopholes).
Quoted from DDTCNews, the KPK sees the mining
sector as a sector that is prone to corrupt practices,
one of which is tax evasion. The Corruption
Eradication Commission (KPK) recorded a shortage
of mining tax payments in forest areas of Rp. 15.9
trillion per year (Hutagaol, 2017). Tax avoidance
cannot be said to conflict with the tax laws because
this practice is dominant in exploiting loopholes in
the tax law which will affect state revenues from the
tax sector (Mangoting, 1999).
The company's profit level also has a significant
influence on the amount of tax that must be paid.
Companies incur debt to avoid taxes, this is the tax
rate charged is calculated after deducting interest
costs from the debt incurred. The company still
benefits from the debt for operations or even business
development, and the amount of taxes that must be
paid will be reduced. Direct contact with the size of
the company, it also has an influence on tax
avoidance. To prevent tax avoidance practices,
internal and external supervision of the company is
needed. An institution that invests in a company will
certainly prevent fraud that has the potential to occur.
The fraud reduces the profits to be received by the
owner company. In addition to internal supervision,
external supervision is also needed to provide a sense
of trust in the wider community in the credibility of
Wagiu, S., Witjaksono, A. and Meiryani, .
Company Size, Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance with Audit Quality as Moderate and Independent Var iables.
DOI: 10.5220/0011242000003376
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Recent Innovations (ICRI 2021), pages 151-157
ISBN: 978-989-758-602-6
Copyright
c
 2022 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
151

the company. It is better to leave it to an auditor who
has a good reputation as seen from extensive
experience so that he knows the loopholes where
there is fraud, including tax evasion.
The practice of tax avoidance, although it does not
violate the law, its economic value is considered
unethical. This results in a loss to the country. This
can increase the realization of state tax revenues for
the development of the Indonesian state. From the
cases that have been described above, the authors are
interested in realizing suggestions from previous
researchers to expand the research sample. The
research was conducted using issuers in the mining
and service sectors. Because the two sectors are
interrelated to each other to increase the state treasury
income. In terms of the research year, the researchers
extended the research period from 2015 to 2020 so
that the research results were more effective and
efficient.
The contribution of this research is to prove that
there is a relationship between the effect of
profitability, firm size, institutional ownership, and
audit quality on tax avoidance, as well as audit quality
as a moderating variable to determine whether to
strengthen or weaken profitability, firm size and
institutional ownership. Therefore, from the
background that the author has described above, the
authors are interested in conducting a study entitled
"The Effect of Profitability, Company Size, and
Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance with
Audit Quality as Moderating Variable and
Independent Variable".
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Positive Accounting Theory
Positive accounting theory grew around the 1960s
which focuses on economic and behavioral
approaches by bringing up the efficient market
hypothesis and agency theory initiated by Watt and
Zimmerman which consists of three hypotheses, (1)
bonus planning, (2) debt covenants, and (3) the cost
of the political process. The dominant positive
accounting theory refers to empirical research that
maximizes profits (investors, managers, and the
public) in choosing the available accounting methods
(Januarti, 2004). In this study, the researcher uses the
political cost theory hypothesis, which explains why
companies choose accounting policies to minimize
the income tax burden. Income tax is considered a
political cost, therefore companies tend to reduce
taxable income. This action is per the definition of tax
avoidance according to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010),
namely an effort to reduce the amount of explicit tax
value through tax planning efforts in the legal and
illegal ranges. Political cost theory introduces a
political dimension to the choice of accounting
policy. According to positive accounting theory, the
accounting procedures used by companies do not
have to be the same as others, but companies are
given the freedom to choose one of the available
alternative procedures to minimize contract costs and
maximize firm value. With this freedom, managers
tend to take action according to the positive
accounting theory, which is called opportunistic
behavior. Thus, opportunistic action is an action taken
by the company in choosing an accounting policy that
is profitable and maximizes the company's
satisfaction.
2.2 Agency Theory
Agency theory Michael (1976) states that there is a
cooperative relationship between two parties, where
the relationship that occurs is a working relationship.
The parties involved in the relationship are between
the party giving the authority (principal) and the party
receiving the authority (agent). The agency model
designs a system with a mutual agreement between
the management as the agent, and the shareholders or
owners as the principal. Agency theory assumes that
it is based on the economics of the man model
(Ghozali, 2020). This model assumes that individuals
(both principal and agent) optimize their respective
utilities (satisfaction). In the principal-agent
relationship, the agent is contracted to maximize the
utility of the principal (Ross, 1973 in Ghozali, 2020);
however, agency theory assumes that the agent will
behave opportunistically, namely maximizing his
interests.
2.3 Hypothesis Development
2.3.1 The Effect of Profitability on Tax
Avoidance
Companies that have high profitability have the
opportunity to carry out tax planning which can
reduce the total burden of tax obligations (Chen et al,
2010). Another argument also comes in support of
(Anouar, 2017), which states that profitability has a
positive effect on tax avoidance. In agency theory, the
agent will try to manage his tax burden so as not to
reduce the agent's performance compensation as a
result of reduced company profits because it is eroded
by the tax burden. Thus, the company's resources are
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used by agents to maximize the agent's performance
compensation, namely by suppressing the company's
tax burden to maximize company performance.
Another study conducted by Oktamawati (2017)
found that profitability affects tax avoidance. H1:
Profitability has a positive effect on tax avoidance.
2.3.2 The Effect of Firm Size on Tax
Avoidance
Research on the relationship between aggressive tax
avoidance and firm size has been carried out by Lanis
and Richardson (2015) with political cost theory
showing a positive relationship between firm size and
aggressive tax avoidance. Another study conducted
by Rego (2003) found that firm size has a positive
effect on tax avoidance. In contrast to previous
research, the results of Fitri (2015) research-based on
political power theory show a negative relationship
between firm size and aggressive tax avoidance. H2:
Firm size has a negative effect on tax avoidance.
2.3.3 The Effect of Institutional Ownership
on Tax Avoidance
Companies whose share ownership is larger are
owned by other corporate institutions or the
government, then the performance of the company's
management to be able to obtain the desired profit
will tend to be monitored by institutional investors.
This encourages management to be able to minimize
the value of taxes owed by the company. In agency
theory, the role of investors, which in this case are
institutions, will reduce the information gap between
agents and investors. So it is hoped that it will reduce
the opportunity for agents to evade tax because agents
are supervised by investors who are also institutions
so that institutional investors also better understand
the state of the company being invested in compared
to investors in general. Research conducted by
Khurana and Moser (2013) found that institutional
ownership does not affect tax avoidance. The
argument above is against the current research
conducted by (Nuralifmida, 2008) which found that
the large or small concentration of institutional
ownership affects tax avoidance policies by
companies. Thus, the hypothesis is formulated
consisting of: H3: Institutional ownership has a
negative effect on tax avoidance.
2.3.4 Effect of Audit Quality on Tax
Avoidance
According to Vincent et al (2011), if a company is
audited by the Big Four Public Accounting Firm
(KAP), it will be difficult to carry out aggressive tax
policies. Auditor industry specialization describes
auditors who already have a lot of industry-specific
knowledge. The Public Accounting Firm (KAP)
industry specialization considers it to be able to
provide more certainty because of the many
experiences in handling clients in different industries
so that it can produce quality audit quality
information (Kusuma and Widiasmara, 2019).
According to the Qorika (2017), it clearly states that
the auditor's consideration of the company's
competitiveness in maintaining the company's
operations must be based on the assessment of a
qualified auditor. So far, the quality of auditors is
juxtaposed with the size and reputation of the Public
Accounting Firm (KAP). Based on agency theory, the
role of the auditor in this case is as a messenger from
the principal to be able to see the performance and as
a supervisory agent in carrying out his duties.
Therefore, the auditor appointed to conduct the audit
must have good knowledge of the loopholes that can
be used to commit fraud. The need for an auditor who
has a good reputation can also be a reference that the
company has been examined by a credible party so
that the company does not commit fraud, which in
this case is tax evasion. Thus, the hypothesis is
formulated consisting of: The role of the auditor in
this case is as a messenger from the principal to be
able to see the performance and as a supervisory agent
in carrying out his duties. H4: Audit quality has a
positive effect on tax avoidance.
2.3.5 The Effect of Profitability on Tax
Avoidance Moderated by Audit
Quality
Based on agency theory, the agent will try to reduce
the amount of his tax burden so that the compensation
received by the agent will be maximized. A high level
of profitability will generate high profits, from high
profits will result in a high tax burden, so that the
company's income will be eroded by the tax burden.
Therefore, the agent will carry out earnings
management to avoid the company's profits from
being eroded by the tax burden. This allows the
company's resources to be managed by agents to
maximize compensation for their performance. The
findings from Dina et al., (2018) state that
profitability has a significant effect on tax avoidance.
The results of this study are not in line with Dina et
al., (2018) which states that profitability does not
affect tax avoidance. H5: Audit quality moderates
profitability on tax avoidance.
Company Size, Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance with Audit Quality as Moderate and Independent Variables
153

2.3.6 The Effect of Firm Size on Tax
Avoidance Moderated by Audit
Quality
Based on political cost theory, firm size has a
negative effect on tax avoidance. This happens
because the larger the company, the more the
company will attract the attention of the regulator so
that the company will reduce actions that can harm
the regulator. This will be able to influence the
company to do tax avoidance. Audit quality in this
case is expected to moderate the effect of firm size on
tax avoidance so that the level of influence of firm
size on tax avoidance can be influenced by audit
quality. Because audit quality in agency theory acts
as a messenger from the principal to check the agent
in carrying out his obligations so that frauds that
occur can be reduced. Research conducted by Qorika
(2017) states that audit quality can affect tax
avoidance. Based on the explanations mentioned
above, the following hypotheses can be made: H6:
Audit quality moderates firm size on tax avoidance.
2.3.7 The Effect of Institutional Ownership
on Tax Avoidance Moderated by Audit
Quality
In agency theory, the role of investors, which in this
case are institutions, will reduce the information gap
between agents and investors. So it is hoped that it
will reduce the opportunity for agents to evade tax
because agents are supervised by investors who are
also institutions, so that institutional investors also
better understand the state of the company being
invested in compared to investors in general.
Research conducted by Krisna (2019) found that high
institutional ownership in a company can affect tax
avoidance by management with the support of
empirical evidence, while research on audit quality
variables does not affect tax avoidance in a company.
In contrast to the research conducted by Ghozali
(2016) which states that audit quality can affect tax
avoidance. Research conducted by Tarekegn and
Ayele (2020) states that audit quality can moderate
the effect of institutional ownership on tax avoidance.
Audit quality in this case is expected to moderate the
effect of institutional ownership on tax avoidance so
that the level of influence of institutional ownership
on tax avoidance can be influenced by audit quality.
Because audit quality in agency theory acts as a
messenger from the principal to check the agent in
carrying out his obligations, so that frauds that occur
can be reduced. Based on the explanations mentioned
above, the following hypotheses can be made:
Research conducted by Adisti Maharani (2019) states
that audit quality can moderate the effect of
institutional ownership on tax avoidance. Audit
quality in this case is expected to moderate the effect
of institutional ownership on tax avoidance so that the
level of influence of institutional ownership on tax
avoidance can be influenced by audit quality.
Because audit quality in agency theory acts as a
messenger from the principal to check the agent in
carrying out his obligations, so that frauds that occur
can be reduced. Based on the explanations mentioned
above, the following hypotheses can be made:
Research conducted by Adisti Maharani (2019) states
that audit quality can moderate the effect of
institutional ownership on tax avoidance. Audit
quality in this case is expected to moderate the effect
of institutional ownership on tax avoidance so that the
level of influence of institutional ownership on tax
avoidance can be influenced by audit quality.
Because audit quality in agency theory acts as a
messenger from the principal to check the agent in
carrying out his obligations, so that frauds that occur
can be reduced. Based on the explanations mentioned
above, the following hypotheses can be made: so that
fraud can be reduced. Based on the explanations
mentioned above, the following hypotheses can be
made: so that fraud can be reduced. Based on the
explanations mentioned above, the following
hypotheses can be made: H7: Audit quality moderates
institutional ownership of tax avoidance.
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The data collection method in this study used panel
data regression. Panel data is a combination of cross-
sectional (individual) and time series (time series)
approaches. The population in this study is the
industry that produces raw materials and services,
totaling 283 companies, in addition to finance. The
sample obtained was 177 issuers from 2015-
2020.The following is a summary of the company's
sectors and sub-sectors that the researcher uses. The
researcher uses this sample because it represents the
population of two industries listed on the Indonesia
Stock Exchange (IDX), namely producers of raw
materials and services, in addition to finance. From
the total of the two industries above, there are 283
companies, then each sector has taken its sub-sector.
The data was obtained manually from the Indonesia
Stock Exchange web page on the website
www.idx.co.id and research.or.id in 2015-2020. The
sampling technique in this study was conducted using
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a purposive sampling method with the following
criteria: (i) mining sector companies listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2015-2020
period; (ii) service sector companies listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2015-2020
period; (iii) companies that publish annual reports and
financial statements that have been audited by
independent auditors in the 2015-2020 period; (iv)
companies that publish their financial statements in
Indonesian Rupiah; (v) Companies that publish their
financial statements in United States Dollars (USD)
and have been converted to Indonesian Rupiah at the
middle rate for December 30, 2020.
4 RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The use of sections to divide the text of the paper is
optional and left as a decision for the author. Where
the author wishes to divide the paper into sections the
formatting shown in Table 2 should be used.
4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis
Results descriptive analysis of the variables of this
study can be seen in the folloing table:
Table 1: Results of Descriptive Aalysis.
Standard deviation value is 0.140, the maximum
value is 0.78, while the minimum value is -3.01. The
mean value of firm size is 9.135, the standard
deviation is 2.832, the maximum value is 15.53, while
the minimum value is 3.001. The mean value of
institutional ownership is 66,702, the standard
deviation value is 20.877, the maximum value is 100,
while the minimum value is 0. The mean value of
audit quality is 4716740421174.32, the standard
deviation value is 105846075379870.2, the
maximum value is 3446794474294695, while the
maximum value is 3446794474294695. The
minimum is 8096190807675,376. The mean value of
tax avoidance is 0.480, the standard deviation is
1.362, the maximum value is 29.725, while the
minimum value is 15.732.
4.2 Panel Data Analysis
The selected panel data model is the Random Effect
Model (REM)
Table 2: Results of Random Effect Model (REM).
Hypothesis Test
Cross-section Time Both
Breusch-Pagan 15.85419
(0.0001)
0.324395
(0.5690)
16,17858
(0.0001)
Based on the test results above, it is known that
the value of both in the Breusch-Pagan section is
0.0001 < 0.05, so it can be concluded that the results
of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test that were
selected were the Random Effect Model (BRAKE).
4.3 Classic Assumption Test
4.3.1 Normality Test
Figure 1: Normality test.
Based on Figure 1, it can be seen that the value of the
probability is 0.000000. This means that it rejects H0,
the prob value is 0.000000 <0.05 the data is not
normally distributed. Because some data contains
outliers. There are some data in 2020 that are empty
(not found in the company's annual report nor on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) web page. After
testing the data and finding outlier data, the
anticipation that can be done consists of removing
outlier data and working on outlier data. However,
philosophically the outlier data should still be used on
the condition that the data includes observations in
the population.
Company Size, Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance with Audit Quality as Moderate and Independent Variables
155

5 CONCLUSION
5.1 Conclusion
Based on the results of the research and discussion
above, the conclusions of this study are as follows: (i)
Profitability has been shown to have a positive effect
on tax avoidance, but it is not significant. This is
because of the level of public sensitivity to the
obligation to pay taxes by with the tax payable
without having to take tax avoidance actions, (ii)
Company size has been shown to have a positive and
significant effect on tax avoidance. This is due to the
maturity level of the company running operations that
produce clear and complex transactions while still
practicing tax avoidance. (iii) Institutional ownership
is proven to have a positive and significant effect on
tax avoidance. This is because to minimize financial
manipulation by managers, it is controlled by the size
of institutional ownership to control the company's
performance. (iv) Audit quality has been shown to
have a positive effect on tax avoidance, but it is not
significant. This is because the big four and non-big
four Public Accounting Firms (KAPs) both have good
reputations. In carrying out his audit duties at a client
company that is guided by quality control standards
on audit quality and the existence of ethical rules that
have been set in carrying out audits. (v) Audit quality
proved insignificant in strengthening the effect of
profitability and institutional ownership and proved
insignificant in weakening the effect of firm size on tax
avoidance. This is because auditors are often
unsuccessful in detecting management behavior that
intentionally practices tax avoidance. (vi) Profitability,
firm size, institutional ownership, and audit quality are
proven to have an effect of 1.4% on tax avoidance,
while the remaining 98.6% are influenced by other
variables not discussed in this study.
5.2 Suggestion
Based on the conclusions, the following suggestions
can be taken: (i) It is suggested to use a predictive
model other than tax avoidance to be used as a proxy
in future research, to be a measure and comparison in
estimating the possibility of companies doing tax
avoidance. (ii) Future researchers are expected to use
other moderating variables, namely outside audit
quality, for example using intervening variables or
control variables. (iii) Future researchers are expected
to be able to combine different samples of companies,
namely outside the mining and service sectors. Thus,
further research will determine the effect on
companies in other sectors.
5.3 Limitation
The limitations of the results of this study are as
follows: (i) This research is limited to two
company sectors, namely the mining sector and
the service sector listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange (IDX) with a research period of 2015-
2020.
(ii) In this study the independent variables
consisting of profitability, company size,
institutional ownership, and quality of income
can affect tax
avoidance only by 1.4%, while the
remaining 98.6% is influenced by other variables
not discussed in
this study. (iii) This study only
uses one dependent variable, namely tax
avoidance.
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