enterprise management, which is conducive to the
alleviation of the entrusted-agent problem.
Related research shows that the media as an
informal governance mechanism will inevitably
affect the financial decision-making of corporate
stakeholders, but there are few related studies on
whether media attention affects the debt financing
costs of listed companies. This article aims to
examine in depth whether media attention affects the
cost of debt financing; whether it will increase or
reduce the cost of debt financing for companies;
divide media reports into non-negative media reports
and negative media reports according to their
substance, and Explore the difference between the
two effects on corporate debt financing costs. The
media is concerned about whether it will have a
consistent impact on the debt financing costs of
companies with different property rights.
2 PRIOR LITERATURE AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Empirical data proves that company characteristic
factors, corporate governance factors and macro-
environmental factors can all have a significant
impact on a company’s debt financing costs. The
media is regarded as the fourth power independent of
legislation, administration, and judiciary, which to a
certain extent, supplements the lack of the system. On
the whole, the media has two major functions:
information intermediary and corporate governance.
First, the media organizes, analyzes, processes, and
releases the collected information to the public,
thereby reducing information costs for information
users and reducing information asymmetry.
Secondly, the media also has corporate governance
functions such as exposing accounting scandals,
protecting investor rights, and curbing financial
restatements and financial fraud (Yang, Kong, 2017,
Wu, et al., 2019). Existing research results show that
the media play a corporate governance function
mechanism in at least three aspects, namely:
traditional supervision mechanism, reputation
mechanism and market pressure mechanism.
Based on the theory of information asymmetry,
reputation theory, and principal-agent theory, this
paper divides media reports into different types of
media reports according to the essence of the report
content, and discusses the influence of media
attention on the cost of corporate debt financing.
According to the information asymmetry theory, the
creditor cannot fully grasp the debtor's true
production and operation status in the borrowing and
lending relationship, so there is a problem of
information asymmetry between the two parties. The
study of Fang and Peress found that information
friction can be alleviated by media reporting on
information (Fang, Peress, 2009). The media plays its
role as an information intermediary, collecting and
organizing corporate information through
professional means, and passing the information to
the market. Through the media’s disclosure of
relevant information, creditors can have a more
comprehensive grasp of the company’s investment
and operation status, return the degree of information
asymmetry to a lower level, and promote creditors to
improve the accuracy when judging the required risk
reward, which is more in line with the real situation
of the enterprise. From a realistic point of view,
media reports can be divided into non-negative and
negative reports according to the type of report, while
non-negative media reports can be divided into
positive and neutral reports. Media’s positive reports
on listed companies signal to creditors that the
company’s business is in good condition and reduce
creditors’ expectations of the risks they face. At this
time, creditors will demand a lower risk
compensation premium, and thus the cost of debt
financing will be reduced. Media's neutral reports on
listed companies can enable investors to have a more
in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the
true investment and operating conditions of the
company, thereby reducing the cost of information
that investors need to pay. Therefore, non-negative
media reports reduce the investment risks faced by
creditors, and are beneficial for listed companies to
obtain debt financing with low borrowing interest
rates and a long term structure. However, when the
media reports a lot of negative news about listed
companies, it will send a bad signal to the capital
market, the creditors will face an increased risk of
default, and the financing constraint dilemma of
enterprises will be further aggravated.
From the reputation theory, reputation, as an
intangible asset of a company, will bring unexpected
benefits to the company. Therefore, companies and
managers are paying more and more attention to
establishing a good image. Generally, creditors will
assess the risks they face based on the reputation of
the company. Compared with companies with poor
reputation, the risk of default by a company with a
good reputation is lower. Therefore, creditors are
more inclined to sign a loan agreement with a
company with a good reputation. Positive media
reports help companies build a good reputation,
deepen stakeholders’ good impressions of the