Research on Risk Evaluation and Risk Response Strategies of
Chinese Internet Public Welfare Crowdfunding Based on Analytic
Hierarchy Process
Jinyao He
1
, Guiyang Wang
1,*
, Xiaoxue Han
2
and Xiangye Kong
3
1
School of Business, University of Western Australia, 6009, Perth, Australia
2
School of Finance, Nanjing Audit University, 211815, Nanjing, China
3
School of Information Technology, 224051, Yancheng, China
213080208@stu.nan.edu.cn, bertkong0304@163.com
Keywords: Analytic Hierarchy Process, Risks of Internet Public Welfare Crowdfunding, Risk Evaluation, Risk
Countermeasures.
Abstract: Internet-based public welfare crowdfunding is a new fundraising approach in China that blends Internet
finance with traditional public welfare crowdfunding. Its fast growth, however, it is accompanied by
enormous hidden risks. Consequently, it is essential to identify and prevent various crowdfunding process
related risks. By categorizing and summarizing the risks associated with Internet-based public welfare
crowdfunding in China, this study uses the Analytic Hierarchy Process to determine the overall ranking of
risks and recommends solutions.
1 INTRODUCTION
The notion of Internet finance has been popularized in
China with the development of "Internet +" and has
become a hot topic in entrepreneurship, investing, the
economy, and other industries. As an example of a
typical Internet finance model, Internet public welfare
crowdfunding has grown quickly in recent years. It is
an innovative financing model that blends Internet
finance and online charity. Internet's benefits can
facilitate the financing of several organizations and
individuals.
Currently, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China
has designated 32 Internet-based fundraising
information portals for non-profit organizations.
Among these, the most well-known are Waterdrop,
Love chip, and Fun in funding, which provide the
public with an increasing number of direct avenues to
donate to charitable causes. In recent years, however,
concerns such as "gaining money" and "fraudulent
donations" have made Internet public welfare
crowdfunding a focal point of scholarly interest. Lin
and Li worried that Internet-based crowdfunding
platforms may become complicit in unlawful
*
Corresponding author
fundraising (Lin, 2016); Yuan feeled that China's
public welfare crowdfunding has raised social doubts
due to a lack of rules, protocols, and management
(Yuan, 2017). In Internet-based public welfare
crowdfunding, there is intentional exaggeration of
project propaganda, misappropriation of fundraising,
inconsistency of returns with promises, and a lack of
inspection of fundraiser access information and
stringent oversight in the project's final stages. These
issues raise the risk of financing, erode the trust of
Internet users, and have a negative effect on the long-
term growth of Internet public welfare crowdfunding.
Consequently, it is vital to examine the risk
identification and risk response strategies of Internet-
based crowdfunding for public welfare.
Using the AHP technique, this research
categorizes potential Internet public welfare
crowdfunding risks in China and creates a risk
hierarchy model for Internet public welfare
crowdfunding. Through the calculation, the overall
rating of each risk is determined, and several coping
solutions are offered based on the risk's significance,
in order to assist the future development of Internet-
based public welfare crowdfunding in China.
214
He, J., Wang, G., Han, X. and Kong, X.
Research on Risk Evaluation and Risk Response Strategies of Chinese Internet Public Welfare Crowdfunding Based on Analytic Hierarchy Process.
DOI: 10.5220/0012028300003620
In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering (ICEMME 2022), pages 214-220
ISBN: 978-989-758-636-1
Copyright
c
 2023 by SCITEPRESS – Science and Technology Publications, Lda. Under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
The remainder of the article is structured as
follows: the second part is devoted to the classification
of risks, the third part is devoted to the Analytic
Hierarchy Process, the fourth part is devoted to the
risk response plan, and the fifth part is devoted to the
conclusion and illumination.
2 CLASSIFICATION OF RISKS
There are a variety of elements that influence the risk
of Internet-based crowdfunding for public welfare.
Before analyzing the origins and shifting tendencies
of Internet public welfare crowdfunding risks, it is
vital to scientifically categorize them. In this study,
Internet public welfare crowdfunding risk is
categorized into four B-layer risk factors: legal risk,
credit risk, audit risk, and platform security risk.
Further classified into 10 C-tier risk categories are the
B-tier risk factors.
2.1 Legal Risk (B1)
Li discovered that the majority of legal risks in over-
the-counter transactions were caused by the legal lag
resulting from financial innovation (Li, 1999). As a
new type of financing, the legal risks associated with
Internet public welfare crowdfunding can be separated
into three groups.
2.1.1 Industry Standard Risk (C1)
Industry standards are standards developed for
technical requirements that do not have national
standards but must be harmonized within a country's
industry.
The research of Dai (Dai, 2021) indicated
that industry standards have a normative and guiding
role for the entire industry and serve as a benchmark
for determining if the project process is compliant.
In 2017, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China
promulgated two industry standards, "Basic Technical
Specifications for Internet Public Fundraising
Information Platforms for Charitable Organizations"
and "Basic Management Specifications for Internet
Public Fundraising Information Platforms for
Charitable Organizations", which provide a technical
level for the requirements for Internet fundraising
platforms but lacks the elaboration of the ethical
aspects of the industry. These immature industry
standards threaten the growth of Internet-based public
welfare crowdfunding.
2.1.2 Legal and Regulatory Risk (C2)
Presently, China's Internet crowdfunding financial
supervisory laws are extremely limited, particularly in
the part of crowdfunding for public welfare, and the
only known relevant legal basis is mainly the "Charity
Law of the People's Republic of China." The law
controls only nonprofit organizations and does not
mention internet crowdfunding platforms for public
welfare. Due to the lack of clarity surrounding the
legal status of Internet-based public welfare
crowdfunding platforms, academic and judicial circles
have not established an uniform criterion and criteria
for their legal status. Consequently, the absence of
laws and regulations in this sector is also among the
most significant risks.
2.1.3 Supervisory Body Risk (C3)
It is also challenging to identify the primary regulatory
authority for the industry in the absence of clear laws
and regulations. Currently, the platform, which has a
sizable fund of fund operation power, is in charge of
fundraising funds, allocating funds, and conducting
fundraising activities in the industry. Once a
crowdfunding initiative goes awry, it is challenging to
recover the losses of the donors' difficult investment
without the supervision of a clear regulatory body.
2.2 Credit Risk (B2)
Credit risk mainly refers to the problem of information
asymmetry presented by seekers and the platform's
inability to sufficiently review information in the
process of public welfare crowdfunding via the
Internet, collectively referred to as credit risk.
2.2.1 Information Asymmetry Risk (C4)
An efficient information bridge between the donor
and the seeker must be constructed for Internet public
welfare crowdfunding, although there are frequently
some issues with information asymmetry. The seekers
may be able to pay for the medical expenses
themselves, but they haven't told the platform or
haven't told it the truth, and it's hard for the platform
to confirm this. As a result, it will mislead the donors
and undermine faith in online public welfare
crowdfunding.
2.2.2 Censorship Risks (C5)
There are risks associated with platform censorship as
well. Due to the platform's inadequate information
review of online public welfare projects, many
Research on Risk Evaluation and Risk Response Strategies of Chinese Internet Public Welfare Crowdfunding Based on Analytic Hierarchy
Process
215
materials and even personal information needed for
fundraising have been altered and tampered, which
has caused to the dissemination of misleading
information. In addition, some crowdfunding projects
that are true but fall short of the fundraising standards
can be approved since the standards for information
review are not strict enough.
2.3 Audit Risk (B3)
Another major risk, which may be broken down into
internal control risk and auditor professional ability
risk, is the audit risk of an online platform for public
good crowdfunding.
2.3.1 Internal Control Risk (C6)
Although various risk control mechanisms are set up
in the operation process as a non-profit Internet public
welfare crowdfunding platform, there are some
objective risks in and of themselves. Many platforms
enhance their risk control mechanisms using AI
intelligence. Because the intelligent AI risk control
technology is not a mature technology that is
acknowledged as being used, some people continue to
use the gaps in it to conduct malicious fundraising,
even if this somewhat solves some malicious
fundraising behaviors.
2.3.2 Auditor Professional Competence Risk
(C7)
The specific processes and handling methods of
online public welfare crowdfunding in terms of fund
payment, fund management, and fund withdrawal are
unfamiliar to auditors in the electronic payment
environment, and they also lack the relevant
experience in handling Internet public welfare
crowdfunding audit risk control. As a result, there is a
dearth of relevant professional expertise in
recognizing and evaluating the audit risks associated
with Internet-based platforms for public welfare
crowdfunding.
2.4 Platform Security Risk (B4)
Platform security risks include those associated with
information leakage, unauthorized fundraising, and
fund management on online platforms for public
good.
2.4.1 Management Risks of Funds Raised
(C8)
It is the platform's duty to hold onto the monies raised
for the fundraiser until the fundraising endeavor is
finished. After deducting the platform management
charge, the crowdfunding platform will distribute the
remaining funds to the project fundraiser if the project
is a success. In this process, all capital flow links were
implemented and controlled by the crowdfunding
platform, which raised the potential risk of fund
management, according to Xu et al. (Xu, 2016). This
is because there is no relevant department to supervise
and escrow the crowdfunding funds.
2.4.2 Illegal Fundraising Risk (C9)
Because Internet public welfare crowdfunding has
such strong public welfare qualities, some criminals
may use these characteristics to construct some illegal
third-party platforms that appear as public welfare
crowdfunding platforms with the intent of defrauding
a sizable amount of cash raised. Additionally, some
tiny platforms will loosen the criteria for help seekers'
reviews in order to gain larger platform management
fees. Ma (Ma, 2018) thought that illegal fund-raising
has severely weakened Internet public welfare
crowdfunding and undermined the people's trust in
online philanthropy.
2.4.3 Information Leakage Risk (C10)
Platforms on the internet for public good
crowdfunding are unbalanced in favor of one over the
other. Keeping profits while meeting the demands of
all social groups, including donors and those seeking
medical care, is extremely difficult for it. Because of
this, many platforms will include advertising in order
to collect advertising fees, increasing revenue and
decreasing losses. Users' personal information may be
compromised if the platform's scrutiny of advertising
is not stringent enough.
3 ANALYTIC HIERARCHY
PROCESS
Analytic Hierarchy Process, an international standard
analysis technique for complicated decision-making
situations, is used in this paper. It was a systematic,
hierarchical analytic method that integrates qualitative
and quantitative analysis, and it was first officially
suggested by the American operations researcher
Thomas L. Saaty (Saaty, 1988) in the middle of the
1970s.
ICEMME 2022 - The International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering
216
3.1 Establishment of a Hierarchical
Model
According to Dong's research, risk identification was
used to construct the hierarchical structure. A
hierarchical structure diagram was ultimately
constructed by sorting and categorizing possible risk
variables, then placing them among several layers
(Dong, 2020). Based on the aforementioned risk
analysis, Figure 1 shows the model of risk hierarchy
for China's online public welfare crowdfunding.
Figure 1: Risk Hierarchy Model of Internet Public Welfare Crowdfunding in China.
3.2 Constructing the Pairwise
Comparison Matrix
By combining the expert scoring results, a paired
comparison matrix may be constructed in accordance
with the risk hierarchy model shown in Figure 1. Ten
expert scoring sheets in total were gathered. The
trustworthiness of scoring was verified by the experts'
affiliation with the TOP 10 Internet public welfare
crowdfunding platforms and their positions as product
operation directors and above. According to Li and
Zhang's research, the judgment matrix is built using
the 1–9 scale approach, and the weights of the
indicators at all levels are then determined (Li, 2006).
Tables 1 to 5 display the scoring results and weight
results for each judgment matrix.
Table 1: Judgment Matrix A-B.
A B1 B2 B3 B4 W
B1 1 3 4 2 0.4673
B2 1/3 1 2 1/2 0.1601
B3 1/4 1/2 1 1/3 0.0954
B4 1/2 2 3 1 0.2772
Ξ»max CI RI CR
4.031 0.0103 0.89 0.0116
Table 2: Judgment Matrix B1-C.
B1 C1 C2 C3 W
C1 1 1/6 1/2 0.102
C2 6 1 5 0.7258
C3 2 1/5 1 0.1721
Ξ»max CI RI CR
3.0291 0.01455 0.52 0.0279
Table 3: Judgment Matrix B2-C.
B2 C4 C5 W
C4 1 1/3 0.25
C5 3 1 0.75
Ξ»max CI RI CR
2 0 0 0
Table 4: Judgment Matrix B3-C.
B3 C6 C7 W
C6 1 3 0.75
C7 1/3 1 0.25
Ξ»max CI RI CR
2 0 0 0
Table 5: Judgment Matrix B4-C.
B4 C8 C9 C10 W
C8 1 5 4 0.6833
C9 1/5 1 1/2 0.1168
C10 1/4 2 1 0.1998
Ξ»max CI RI CR
3.0246 0.0123 0.52 0.0237
Internet Public Welfare Crowdfunding Risks (A)
Legal Risk (B1)
Industry Standard Risk (C1)
Legal and Regulatory Risk (C2)
Supervisory Body Risk (C3)
Credit Risk (B2)
Information Asymmetry
Risk (C4)
Censorship Risks (C5)
Audit Risk (B3)
Internal Control Risk (C6)
Auditor Professional
Competence Risk (C7)
Platform Security Risk (B4)
Management Risks of
Funds Raised (C8)
Illegal Fundraising
Risk (C9)
Information Leakage
Risk (C10)
Research on Risk Evaluation and Risk Response Strategies of Chinese Internet Public Welfare Crowdfunding Based on Analytic Hierarchy
Process
217
3.3 Calculate the Single Sorting Weight
Vector and Do the Consistency Test
Enter each judgment matrix into the Matlab program
to determine its greatest eigenvalue and eigenvector,
then compute the weight vector for each index, and
finally run a consistency check on each judgment
matrix to guarantee the accuracy of the data. The
consistency test is qualified with the result CR≀0.1.
The calculation formulas of CR and CI are as follows,
and the value of RI is displayed in Table 6.
𝐢𝑅 = 𝐢𝐼/𝑅𝐼

1

𝐢𝐼 =
πœ†
ξ― ξ―”ξ―«
βˆ’π‘›
π‘›βˆ’1

2

CR is the consistency ratio, CI is the consistency
index, Ξ»
max
is the largest eigenroot, n is the order of the
matrix, and RI is a random one-time index.
Table 6: Random consistency index RI.
Order
(
nth
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
RI 0 0 0.58 0.89 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 1.52 1.54
3.4 Calculate the Total Sorting Weight
Vector and Do a Combined
Consistency Test
The weights of the first-level indicators and the
second-level indicators must be multiplied one by one
in order to determine the total weight. Next, go layer
by layer from the bottom to the top to determine the
weight of each indication. The results of the
hierarchy's overall ranking consistency test are shown
in Table 7, and the overall ranking results for each risk
factor hierarchy are shown in Table 8. The formula for
calculating the total weight consistency ratio CR
t
is as
follows.
𝐢𝑅
ξ―§
=
𝑏

𝐢𝐼
1
+𝑏
ξ¬Ά
𝐢𝐼
ξ¬Ά
+β‹―+𝑏
ξ― 
𝐢𝐼
ξ― 
𝑏

𝑅𝐼

+𝑏
ξ¬Ά
𝑅𝐼
ξ¬Ά
+β‹―+𝑏
ξ― 
𝑅𝐼
ξ― 

3

CI
m
is the consistency index of the m
th
matrix of
the second level, and b
m
is the weight of the index B
of the first level.
Table 7: Total Sort Consistency Test.
CI
i
0.0146 0 0 0.0123
RI
i
0.52 0 0 0.52
CR
i
0.0280 0 0 0.0237
CI 0.0102
RI 0.3871
CR 0.0263
Table 8: Overall ranking of risk factors in Internet public welfare crowdfunding.
B1 B2 B3 B4 Total Weight Ran
k
0.4673 0.1601 0.0954 0.2772
C1 0.1020 0.0477 7
C2 0.7258 0.3392 1
C3 0.1721 0.0804 4
C4 0.2500 0.0400 8
C5 0.7500 0.1200 3
C6 0.7500 0.0716 5
C7 0.2500 0.0239 10
C8 0.6833 0.1894 2
C9 0.1168 0.0324 9
C10 0.1998 0.0554 6
As can be seen from Table 8, the ranking of Legal
and Regulatory Risk (C2) and Supervisory Body Risk
(C3) is higher, indicating that Legal Risk (B1) is the
most important risk facing China's Internet public
welfare crowdfunding. Management Risks of Funds
Raised (C8) and Censorship Risks (C5) rank high and
are also very important and noteworthy risk factors.
The ranking of risk factors can reflect the relative
importance of different risk factors; therefore,
corresponding coping strategies can be proposed
according to their importance.
4 RISK RESPONSE STRATEGIES
The following four risk prevention strategies are
proposed for the significance of various risk factors in
ICEMME 2022 - The International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering
218
light of the results in the aforementioned table.
Among them, the first and second points are currently
strongly recommended strategies, while the third and
fourth points are optional techniques.
(i) Speed up the development of China's Internet
public welfare crowdfunding laws and regulations and
make clear who will be in charge of them. One idea is
to create a law on Internet public welfare
crowdfunding by incorporating current laws and
regulations including the Public Welfare Donation
Law, the Foundation Management Regulations, the
Social Organization Registration Management
Regulations, and the Charity Law. Both the notion of
Internet public welfare crowdfunding and the law's
intended application should be explicitly defined in
the law's text. At the same time, it should distinctly
define the regulations governing the creation of
crowdfunding platforms, the verification of platform
eligibility, and the project access review procedure.
Additionally, the decision made by the supervisory
authority is crucial. Since the specific supervisory
department for Internet public welfare crowdfunding
has not yet been established, the government should
do so as soon as possible in order to improve the
effectiveness of the department's oversight and the
speed with which the law is applied to the sector.
Aside from the development of industry associations,
the release, fundraising, and implementation of
Internet public welfare crowdfunding projects can be
effectively supervised to some extent by industry
associations as well as government supervision
departments. In addition to improving the protection
of donors' legal rights and interests, this will
significantly advance the healthy growth of public
benefit crowdfunding.
(ii) Putting up more restrictions for Internet public
welfare crowdfunding platforms and project sponsors.
The entrance of crowdfunding platforms and project
sponsors should be the first step in the risk prevention
of online public welfare crowdfunding. The stability
of the industry's future development is determined by
the access threshold level. According to Dai (Dai,
2021), platforms for crowdsourcing could be
regulated in the form of filing when they were in their
early stages of development, while platforms that
would more developed could be regulated in the form
of approval and are actively watched during their
following operations. Moreover, the welfare should
provide financial incentives to big Internet businesses
so they will enter the industry and contribute to the
public good by enabling the adoption of more cutting-
edge technologies and the resulting standardization of
the industry. Reviewing project sponsors' access
requirements is also essential to reducing hazards. The
access assessment of the project sponsors and
beneficiaries must be stringent and thorough, and if
necessary, they can cooperate with the civil affairs and
public security departments to thoroughly examine
their identification information, family information,
and bank information.
(iii) Give the internal control system your
complete attention while enhancing the auditors'
technical competence. The audit risk of China's online
public welfare crowdfunding platform, in Jiang's
opinion (Jiang, 2022), was significantly influenced by
the lack of adequate internal controls. Auditors should
speak with the grassroots staff of the Internet public
welfare crowdfunding platform prior to beginning the
audit procedure to gain a thorough understanding of
the platform's fundraising process and to check in
advance to see if there is any conflict of interest or a
relationship between fundraising behavior and
employee performance. In addition, auditors should
thoroughly examine the internal controls and
efficiency of Internet public welfare crowdfunding
platforms in order to minimize audit risks and
guarantee audit quality. To do this, they should assess
the whole internal control system of these platforms.
The professional competence of auditors is something
else that needs to be enhanced, and their lack of
competence is a significant factor contributing to audit
risk. The number of qualified auditors should
increase, and accounting firms should develop
compound auditors with expertise in both traditional
auditing and public-welfare crowdfunding.
(iv) Develop network security technologies, make
the platform's information more transparent, and set
up a third party fund custody system. The first thing
the platform needs to do to address the platform
security concerns of China's Internet public welfare
crowdfunding is to increase the transparency of
project information, which includes particular
information like financing strategies, amounts, and
fund management plans. Giving donors complete
transparency and enhancing the platform's legitimacy
would help them garner more support, which will help
the seekers raise money more swiftly. Furthermore,
crowdfunding platforms must establish a third-party
fund custody mechanism and segregate their own
accounts from fund funds in order to prevent being
associated with fund fraud or unlawful fundraising. Its
benefit is the realization of the separation of capital
flow and information flow, the prevention of the
platform's illegal operation, and at the same time the
reduction of the platform's management burden and
legal risks, allowing the platform to simply assume the
roles of an intermediary and carry out its own tasks. In
addition, platforms should be encouraged to recruit
Research on Risk Evaluation and Risk Response Strategies of Chinese Internet Public Welfare Crowdfunding Based on Analytic Hierarchy
Process
219
and develop cybersecurity technological expertise in
response to the risk of information leaking. In order to
maintain the smooth operation of the platform and the
security of investors' personal information and
finances, public welfare crowdfunding platforms
should actively study the most recent information in
the field of network security, increase investment in
money, people, and resources, and outfit a
professional network security team.
5 CONCLUSION
The risks associated with Internet public welfare
crowdfunding in China are divided into four distinct
categories and ten specific risk variables in this paper.
The following results were reached after using the
analytical hierarchy technique to investigate,
construct a hierarchical structure model, determine its
total risk ranking:
(i) The biggest risk that China's Internet public
welfare crowdfunding industry faces is legal risk,
therefore the nation needs to improve its proprietary
laws and regulations as soon as possible and clarify
the monitoring department. (ii) Management risks of
funds raised and censorship risk now have a stronger
impact on China's Internet public welfare
crowdfunding; these risks should be handled by
developing a third-party fund trust mechanism and
raising the entry threshold for platforms and project
initiators. (iii) Despite having a negligible impact,
audit risk must be taken into account. Platforms
should focus entirely on the internal control system to
minimize internal corruption, and accounting firms
should raise the professional standards of auditors and
improve compound talents that can successfully
combine audit knowledge with knowledge of public
welfare crowdfunding.
The expert scoring table that was created for this
paper's article still has the following flaws: the content
is too macroscopic, and the depth of the study is
hampered by the lack of content that accurately
reflects the impact of specific risks. The suggested risk
response method needs to be further investigated and
improved due to a lack of field research and real-world
experience. In next work and research, these
deficiencies must be continuously researched and
applied.
REFERENCES
Dai H. Risk Analysis and Prevention of Internet Public
Welfare Crowdfunding [J]. China Management
Informationization, 2021.
Dong W. Research on Real Estate Investment Risk
Evaluation and Risk Response Strategy Based on
Analytic Hierarchy process [J]. Journal of Anhui
University of Technology (Social Sciences), 2020,
37(4): 28-31.
Jiang J. Research on Audit Risk of Internet Public Welfare
Crowdfunding Platform [D]. Inner Mongolia
University of Finance and Economics, 2022.
Li R. International Financial Law [J]. Revised edition in
2005 10 month. Wuhan University Press, 1999.
Li X, Zhang B. The Application of Analytic Hierarchy
Process in Real Estate Investment System Risk
Evaluation[J]. Construction & Design for Project, 2006
(1): 64-65.
Lin Y, Li J. Research on P2P Online Lending Platform
Crime and Judicial Governance [J]. Hebei Law
Science, 2016, 34(10): 190-200.
Ma X. For online public welfare crowdfunding, supervision
cannot be "absent" [J]. People's Tribune, 2018, (34):
74-75.
Saaty T L. What is the analytic hierarchy process?
[M]//Mathematical models for decision support.
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1988: 109-121.
Xu J, Huo B, Wang R. Development Logic, Business
Efficiency and Risk Mechanism of Online
Crowdfunding [J]. Study and Practice, 2016 (9): 45-53.
Yuan Y. Research on the Development Status and Trend of
Public Welfare Crowdfunding in China [J]. Hebei
Academic Journal, 2017, 37(6): 154-158.
ICEMME 2022 - The International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering
220