Soft Power of Qatar in Central Asia

Aitov Marat Rakhmatullaevich

Independent Researcher, Russia

Keywords: Qatar, Central Asia, “Soft Power”, “Mosque Diplomacy”, Influence, Extremism, Terrorism, Muslim

Brotherhood.

Abstract: The author analyzes Qatar's efforts to promote “soft power” in the Central Asian region. The small emirate

has recently significantly strengthened its presence in the Central Asian countries through the construction of

various religious educational institutions, as well as the provision of humanitarian assistance. The author

identified potential challenges and threats of such activities in the region, primarily through the promotion of

Islam which is not typical for the region.

1 INTRODUCTION

Recently, the Arab States of the Persian Gulf have

intensified their policies towards Central Asia.

Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab

Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain are consistently

deepening cooperation with Central Asia in the

political, trade, economic, cultural and humanitarian

spheres.

The parties have started the process of

institutionalization of their cooperation. In 2023, the

format "Central Asia – Cooperation Council of the

Arab States of the Persian Gulf" was launched and

became fully functional. In 2021, the trade turnover

between Central Asia and the GCC reached $ 3.1

billion. Arab countries are increasing investments in

energy, infrastructure and other areas.

At the same time, the presence of Arab states is

felt not only in the economy but also in the spiritual

and cultural life of Central Asia. They promote their

culture and values in the region through "mosque

diplomacy", which is based on the construction of

mosques and schools, the preparation of imams, the

distribution of textbooks and the financing of

educational centres and cultural institutions.

In this regard, the activities of the small but

economically developed State of Qatar are of interest.

The Emirate pursues an ambitious foreign policy that

affects the Middle East, South and Central Asia. In

recent years, Doha has opened embassies throughout

the region. The leadership of Qatar (the Emir and the

https://orcid.org/0009-0002-4513-2923

Foreign Minister) visited the Central Asian states 13

times. At the same time, most of the visits (8)

occurred after 2012.

However, the emirate's economic presence in

Central Asia remains rather weak. Qatar has a tiny

trade with the region and can’t compete with the UAE

and Saudi Arabia. Despite this, the Qataris are

consistently expanding their ideological influence in

the region. Qatar allocates significant funding for

projects related to humanitarian aid, development

needs and support for Islamic culture in a region that

is not part of its strategic interests.

In this regard, researchers are studying the reasons

and factors that encourage Qatar to strengthen its

presence in Central Asia, as well as the possible

consequences of such a policy in the region.

2 THE IDEOLOGY IN QATAR'S

FOREIGN POLICY

The Persian Gulf States represent a special region in

which Islam has always played a dominant role.

Being the cradle of this religion, the Gulf countries

have always been regarded as the guardians of Arab-

Muslim culture, its values and traditions.

Consequently, the Islamic factor plays a crucial role

in the foreign policy of these countries.

Wahhabi Sunni Islam prevails in Qatar. The ruling

Al-Thani family traces its lineage back to the founder

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Rakhmatullaevich, A.

Soft Power of Qatar in Central Asia.

DOI: 10.5220/0012965500003882

Paper published under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

In Proceedings of the 2nd Pamir Transboundary Conference for Sustainable Societies (PAMIR-2 2023), pages 1302-1305

ISBN: 978-989-758-723-8

of Wahhabism, Mohammed Abdel Wahab (1703-

1787). It is believed that the current Emir of Qatar,

Tamim bin Hamad, is his 18th great-grandson.

According to the Qatari sheikhs, the at-Thani and

Midadi clans brought the true ideas of Wahhabism to

the Qatari peninsula, while the al-Saud tribe distorted

it, giving features of isolation and religious

intolerance (Al-Makbali, 2018 - Egorov, 2019). In

this regard, the Qatari sheikhs believe that they

deserve to be the rulers of the entire Arabian

Peninsula and guard two of the three holy cities in

Islam – Mecca and Medina (Al-Makbali, 2018 -

Egorov, 2019).

Qatar positions itself as a centre for the revival of

Arab and Islamic culture, where modernity, aspects

of Islamic socialism, as well as the ideas of

Wahhabism are successfully combined. The Qatari

elite considers it their duty to propagandize and

spread Wahhabism all over the world.

In particular, the Qatari Constitution emphasizes

a commitment to "protect the identity of Arab and

Islamic countries." (Al-Makbali, 2018 - Egorov,

2019) In this regard, Doha's foreign policy interests

are primarily related to maintaining peace and

sustainable prosperity in Islamic countries.

The emirate pays special attention to the

promotion of its "soft power" in Muslim-populated

countries. More than a hundred Qatari charitable

organizations finance the construction of mosques

and madrassas around the world, religious education

and various religious organizations (Al-Makbali,

2018 - Egorov, 2019). Only the NGO "Qatar Charity"

carries out the construction of about 10 thousand

mosques in more than 50 countries of the world, of

which 7896 have already been commissioned (Al-

Makbali, 2018 - Egorov, 2019).

As a result, Qatar's "soft power" extends far

beyond the Middle East, making it one of the largest

players among Islamic countries. Based on this, a

small emirate competes with much larger Saudi

Arabia, Iran and Turkey.

3 QATAR IN CENTRAL ASIA

As the geography of cooperation expands, Qatar is

gradually strengthening its presence in Central Asia,

with which it shares religious bonds. Doha has been

pursuing an active foreign policy towards the region

since the 2010s. The opening of the emirate's

embassies also took place at this time – in Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan – in 2012, in Turkmenistan – in 2014,

in Uzbekistan – in 2023 (in Kazakhstan, the embassy

was launched a little earlier - in 2008).

Qatar's political cooperation with the countries of

the region has also intensified. The Central Asian

leaders have collectively visited Qatar 11 times. Of

these, the President of Kazakhstan – four times (1998,

2007, 2015, 2022), Turkmenistan – three times (2010,

2017, 2023), Kyrgyzstan (2014, 2015) and

Uzbekistan (2010, 2023) – twice[6]. In 2017, the

President of Tajikistan E. Rahmon paid a state visit to

the Emirate.

At the same time, Qatar has a relatively small

economic presence in the countries of Central Asia.

The trade turnover of the emirate with the Central

Asian states is symbolic. By the end of 2021, Qatar's

trade turnover with the countries of the region

amounted to less than $ 40 million, which is 0.03% of

the emirate's foreign trade ($115 billion).

The Emirate invests exclusively in those areas that

are of interest to it (energy, Islamic banking, real

estate, food). Qatari businessmen have invested $500

million in Kazakhstan in a joint venture in the field of

solar energy, which produces semiconductor wafers

and solar cells for shipment to Qatar.

In Tajikistan, Qatar has invested in real estate.

Qatar's state investment company "Diar Real Estate

Investment Company" is building an elite residential

complex worth $180 million. Qatar's Izdon Holding

took an active part in the creation of Tajikistan's first

Islamic Tawhidbank (2019).

According to Kyrgyz media, Qatar has expressed

interest in exporting organic agricultural products

from Kyrgyzstan, especially honey and meat. In

particular, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is

negotiating with the Qatari company Khasat on the

export of Kyrgyz agricultural products. In early

March 2012, the Kyrgyz delegation visited Doha,

where it reached an agreement on the creation of an

investment fund of $100 million for the

implementation of various projects in the

republic[10].

4 QATAR'S "SOFT POWER" IN

CENTRAL ASIA

The emirate pays special attention to the promotion

of its "soft power" in Central Asia. Qatari non-

governmental organizations support believers and

charity work in the region. Doha extensively finances

the construction of Islamic educational institutions,

mosques

One of the first regional projects supported by

Qatar was the Nur Astana Islamic Cultural Center, for

the construction of which $6.8 million was allocated.

Soft Power of Qatar in Central Asia

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Work on the construction of the centre began in 1999

and was completed in 2005. The Center consists of

the Nur Astana Mosque, designed for 5 thousand

believers, the Center for Islamic Studies and a

religious educational institution.

Kazakhstan also attracts Qatari funds for

humanitarian and environmental projects. On

September 1, 2018, the opening of the secondary

school complex named after him took place in Nur-

Sultan. Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani.

The Emirate also contributed to the implementation

of the project of a rehabilitation centre for victims of

nuclear tests.

Like many monarchies of the Persian Gulf, Qatar

spares no expense on gigantic projects, especially for

the maintenance of Islam. The Qatari authorities have

allocated $70 million. for the construction of the

largest central mosque in the CIS in Dushanbe with

an area of 12 hectares, which can simultaneously

accommodate 115 thousand people (Al-Makbali,

2018 - Egorov, 2019)

The emirate's "mosque diplomacy" is most active

in Kyrgyzstan. In recent years, Qatar has contributed

to the construction of more than 40 mosques and

religious educational institutions in this country (Al-

Makbali, 2018 - Egorov, 2019). The Qatari charity

organization "Qatar Charity" started working in the

Kyrgyz Republic in 2003. It provides "social

assistance to needy segments of the population –

mothers, children and the disabled." According to the

representative office of Qatar Charity in Bishkek, it

pays monthly assistance to 2,100 orphans in 7 regions

of Kyrgyzstan (Al-Makbali, 2018 - Egorov, 2019).

After the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan (spring 2021), Qatar Charity organized the

delivery of humanitarian aid to the Batken region.

The organization handed over 110 tons of food to 2

thousand families and also allocated 100 thousand

dollars for the construction of housing for victims of

the conflict.

5 CHALLENGES AND THREATS

TO THE REGION

Qatar's persistent promotion of its "soft power" raises

concerns in a number of countries around the world.

This is due to Qatar's history of interaction with

extremist and terrorist groups around the world. In

particular, the emirate was accused of moral and

financial support for various groups in Chechnya,

Libya, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Afghanistan,

Somalia and a number of other countries.

According to numerous testimonies, Doha

financed such groups as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Jabhat

al-Nusra (later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham). Qatar provides

patronage to the Muslim Brotherhood movement,

which is the oldest and largest fundamentalist

organization in the world. Qatar has granted asylum

to the chairman of the World Council of Ulema, the

spiritual leader of the movement Youssef al-Qardawi,

the Chechen separatist Z.Yandarbiyev, the leader of

Hamas H.Mashal and others.

There are opinions that Qatar's active promotion

of its vision of Islam challenges the basic provisions

and principles of local Islam formed in a particular

country. Moreover, such activities can lead to a

deterioration of interethnic relations in society, and an

increase in radicalism, xenophobia and anti-

Semitism.

It is noteworthy that similar concerns were

expressed even in European countries. In particular,

the UK government drew attention to the fact that in

2017-2018 the Qatar Charity provided about $ 30

million to a number of conservative Islamic

institutions. London stressed that Doha-sponsored

institutions expressed anti-Semitic slogans, as well as

showed intolerance towards Christians.

In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is the greatest threat

in this regard. The number of mosques and religious

centres in the country has exceeded the number of

schools, which is paradoxical for a secular state. As

of March 2023, there are 2.9 thousand Islamic

organizations in Kyrgyzstan, including 2,669

mosques and 125 madrassas. Moreover, the number

of mosques has increased 75 times compared to 1991.

At the same time, the number of general education

institutions in the country is significantly less – 2.6

thousand, and the total capacity is only 600 thousand

seats.

No less important, there are more different

religious Muslim movements in Kyrgyzstan. In

particular, according to various sources, there are

followers of at least 10 forms in the country. Given

that Qatar actively promotes political Islam and

supports numerous groups, its activities in

Kyrgyzstan and in Central Asia should cause concern

in the countries of the region.

6 CONCLUSIONS

Despite the fact that Central Asia is not a priority of

Qatar's foreign policy, the emirate is gradually

increasing cooperation with the countries of the

region. At the same time, "soft power" is primarily

used as an instrument of influence, the promotion of

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one's own values based on the Wahhabi form of

Islam.

At the same time, the strengthening of Qatar's "soft

power" in the region causes concern in the countries

of Central Asia. Experts warn of the possible

strengthening of non-traditional trends of Islam in the

region, which could lead to the radicalization of the

population, and the spread of ideas of

fundamentalism and extremism among them.

In this regard, Central Asian countries should

carefully monitor the activities of NGOs and various

charitable foundations supported by Qatar and other

Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. Religious and

educational institutions built with Arab money are of

particular interest.

Another important task facing the Central Asian

States is to encourage the development and

popularization of enlightened Islam, a characteristic

of the region. It is also necessary to strengthen the

training of qualified clerics who can bring the true

essence of Islam to the general population. The region

should have its own authoritative representatives of

the clergy who are able to rally believers around

themselves.

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