manage identities securely while also protecting data
privacy. Several research studies on privacy in Cloud
identity management have been proposed to that
purpose. Among them, the following ones are
relevant:
(Angin et al., 2010) present IdM Wallet, a
solution for entity-centric Identity Management
(IdM) in the Cloud that employs an active
package scheme. The active bundle is a
container for metadata, access control policies,
personally identifiable information, and the
virtual machine (which manages and controls
the program code included in a bundle). The
zero-knowledge proof is used to authenticate
an entity without exposing its identifier,
resulting in an anonymous identification. With
this idea, it is feasible to utilize identity data in
unreliable hosts and to reduce sensitive data on
the network by providing just the attributes
required by each service provider;
(Weingärtner & Westphall, 2014) combine the
use of encryption, policy management, and
notification of service provider confidence
levels. Their method addresses the lack of
control over user identification data when
enrolling with federated Identity Providers
(IdPs). Users can set their attribute distribution
policies, choosing which Personal Identifiers
Information (PIIs) are released. However, user-
centric distribution policy management can
cause issues because the majority of users lack
appropriate expertise about policy generation
and management;
• (Spyra et al., 2016) deal with data storage in
the Cloud and the protection of sensitive data.
The proposal adds eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) to the Office
Open XML (OOXML) document format,
defining a sticky policy that ensures the
integrity and credibility of information. To
enforce the XACML policy, cryptography-
based identity (IBE) is used as an
authentication technique.
3 SOLID-EMPOWERED
MULTI-CLOUD IDENTITY
MANAGEMENT
The contribution of this research proposal is to
improve the different phases of the reference privacy-
preserving management of digital identity attributes
in domains with heterogeneous name spaces
architecture shown in Figure 1 with particular
regards to privacy preserving tasks using SOLID
decentralized data stores, which establish a
standardized framework for personal data storage and
sharing on the Web. This specification enables
individuals to exert fine-grained control over their
digital identities, foster enhanced privacy and user
agency, and epitomizes a paradigm shift by placing
data ownership and control squarely in the hands of
the user. As mentioned in Section 1, we use the same
SOLID philosophy on different Web systems applied
to different Clouds via PODs, so that achieving
effective and efficient privacy-preserving identity
management over multi-Clouds.
To address the problem of privacy-preserving
management of digital identity attributes in domains
with heterogeneous name spaces, this privacy-
preserving multi-factor identity attribute verification
protocol can match Cloud service providers and client
vocabularies using a matching technique based on
look-up tables, dictionaries, and ontology mapping
techniques. The protocol uses an Aggregate Zero
Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge (AgZKPK)
cryptographic protocol to allow clients prove
knowledge of multiple identity attributes with a single
interactive proof without having to provide them in
clear (Bertino et al., 2009).
3.1 SOLID
SOLID is a specification that allows for storing data
securely in decentralized data stores called PODs,
where PODs are like secure personal Web servers for
data. The main idea consists in creating, for every
user (or user group) one POD that contains privacy-
preserving user data and access it across multiple
Clouds, without the need for re-identification. This
approach enforces scalability and self-authentication,
thus reducing the risk of cyber-attacks, by also
introducing the nice amenity of limiting data entry
activities that may increase the possibility of identity
thefts and personal-data attacks.
In this case, SOLID stores the information related
to user identity attributes used in this multi-factor
identity attribute verification approach which is
managed by the Registrar component, namely,
Identity Records (IdRs) containing identity tuples for
each user identity attribute. Each identity tuple
consists of a tag, that is, an attribute name, the
Pedersen commitment of the attribute value, the
signature of the Registrar on the commitment, and
two types of assurance, namely validity assurance and
ownership assurance, and a set of nyms (weak
identifiers) along with ontology mappings, set of