Recommendation of Optimal Mitigation Actions Using Causal
Inference in LOCA Events at Nuclear Power Plants
Ji Hun Park
a
, Hye Seon Jo
b
, Ho Jun Lee
c
and Man Gyun Na
d
Department of Nuclear Engineering, Chosun University, 10 Chosundae 1-gil, Dong-gu, Gwangju, Republic of Korea
Keywords: Optimal Mitigation Actions, Causal Inference, Causal Impact, Loss of Coolant Accident,
Nuclear Power Plants.
Abstract: In nuclear power plants, ensuring safety during abnormal situations is of paramount importance. This study
focuses on the loss of coolant accident, a design basis accident, and applies the use of causal inference to
recommend optimal mitigation actions. The study utilizes data collected from the compact nuclear simulator
to analyze the effectiveness of various actions, including the activation of charging pumps and adjustments to
control valves. The results indicate that the simultaneous activation of charging pumps #2 and #3 yields the
highest cumulative absolute effect on maintaining the pressurizer water level. Additionally, keeping the
charging control valve and letdown back pressure valve fully open (100%) also contributes significantly to
managing the pressurizer water level during loss of coolant accident scenarios. These findings provide
valuable insights into improving nuclear power plant safety by guiding operators in choosing the most
effective mitigation strategies during LOCA situation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are electricity-
generating facilities that use nuclear fuel to produce
electricity. The use of nuclear fuel can involve the
release of radioactive materials, making safety a top
priority for NPPs.
However, accidents can occur in NPPs for various
reasons. In NPPs, accidents are categorized as
abnormal, emergency, or severe. This study focuses
on abnormal situations in NPPs. Abnormal situations
are defined as the period from when one or more
preset alarms are triggered due to the occurrence of
an abnormal event under normal conditions until the
reactor is shut down. When abnormal situations occur
in NPPs, operators diagnose the issue and take
mitigation actions based on procedures known as
abnormal operating procedures. These procedures
suggest appropriate mitigation actions but do not
specify them in detail.
For example, in a loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
situation, one of the design basis accidents for NPPs,
a
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6225-5621
b
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4413-5244
c
https://orcid.org/0009-0001-5155-9483
d
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0097-3403
the general response is to activate a charging pump.
LOCA situations involve a rupture in the primary
piping of NPPs with a closed-loop configuration,
leading to the leakage of primary coolant into the
containment and a reduction in the primary coolant
inventory. The primary coolant is crucial for cooling
the heat generated by nuclear fuel, necessitating the
maintenance of an adequate coolant inventory.
Operating a charging pump, which draws water from
a separate source and injects it into the primary
system, can be an appropriate mitigation action.
However, the procedures typically do not specify how
many of the three available charging pumps should be
operational. This ambiguity provides flexibility for
operators but also places the burden of decision-
making on them, making it challenging to ensure the
optimal mitigation action for each situation.
In this study, we introduce a method that uses
causal inference to suggest mitigation actions for
operators in LOCA situations in NPPs. The causal
inference method estimates and quantifies the causal
effect of specific mitigation actions, providing a
440
Park, J., Jo, H., Lee, H. and Na, M.
Recommendation of Optimal Mitigation Actions Using Causal Inference in LOCA Events at Nuclear Power Plants.
DOI: 10.5220/0013018900003822
Paper published under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Informatics in Control, Automation and Robotics (ICINCO 2024) - Volume 1, pages 440-444
ISBN: 978-989-758-717-7; ISSN: 2184-2809
Proceedings Copyright © 2024 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda.
quantitative evaluation of these actions. The
quantified effectiveness of these actions can inform
operators about the most likely means of mitigation.
This study is a foundational research effort on
mitigation action suggestion systems for NPPs and
focuses exclusively on LOCA situations, a design
basis accident for NPPs. In addition, a critical safety
function in LOCA situaitons is the primary coolant
inventory. The crticial safety function is a key feature
that must be maintained to mitigate an accident.
Based on the pressurizer (PRZ) water level, which is
an indicator of the primary coolant inventory, the
appropriate action is determined (i.e., maintaining a
normal PRZ water level is a primary goal).
Data were collected using a simulator, the
Compact Nuclear Simulator (CNS). The mitigation
measures investigated included 1) the activation of
charging pumps, 2) adjustments to the charging
control valve, and 3) adjustments to the letdown Back
Pressure Valve (BPV). Based on these measures, the
following five scenarios were organized to obtain
data: 1) activation of charging pump #2, 2) activation
of charging pump #3, 3) simultaneous activation of
charging pumps #2 and #3, 4) adjusting the opening
state of the charging control valve (ranging from 10%
to 100% in 10% intervals), and 5) adjusting the
opening state of the letdown BPV (ranging from 10%
to 100% in 10% intervals).
By using the causal inference method and
providing the evaluated results to operators, this
approach is expected to significantly enhance
accident management in NPPs.
2 METHOD
Causal inference is a statistical method that aims to
identify and quantify cause-and-effect relationships
between variables. In this study, we utilize the causal
impact method (Brodersen et al., 2015), a specific
approach within the broader field of causal inference.
This method is based on Bayesian structural time-
series models and estimates the causal effect of an
intervention (e.g., mitigation actions) by comparing
data from before and after the intervention. The
causal impact method has three main components: 1)
time series modeling, 2) posterior analysis, and 3)
synthetic control and flexibility.
The causal impact method employs structural
time-series models, which include state-space
representations to account for trends, and other
temporal patterns in the data. The model comprises an
observation equation, which links observed data to
latent state variables, and a state equation, which
describes how these state variables evolve over time.
Using a Bayesian framework, the causal impact
method estimates the causal effect of an intervention
by comparing the observed data post-intervention to
a predicted counterfactual scenario based on pre-
intervention data. This comparison allows for the
quantification of the intervention's impact, including
absolute and relative effects, with uncertainty
intervals that provide insights into the confidence of
these estimates.
Additionally, the method constructs a synthetic
control group using a combination of control series
that closely match the treated unit's pre-treatment
behavior. This approach avoids rigid assumptions
about the control group and allows for the flexible
incorporation of multiple sources of variation in the
data, such as local trends and seasonality. This
flexibility is crucial for accurately capturing the
impact of interventions in complex real-world
scenarios.
3 DATA
The data were collected using the compact nuclear
simulator (CNS), developed by the Korea Atomic
Energy Research Institute. The CNS is a simulator
modeled after the Westinghouse 930 MWe 3-loop
pressurized water reactor (Park et al., 1997). This
simulator can replicate a variety of abnormal,
emergency, and normal situations, and is capable of
introducing various malfunctions.
Figure 1 illustrates the configuration of the
chemical and volume control system (CVCS), which
is responsible for maintaining the primary inventory.
Figure 1: Configuration of CVCS.
Recommendation of Optimal Mitigation Actions Using Causal Inference in LOCA Events at Nuclear Power Plants
441
In this study, data were collected for five
scenarios based on the CVCS components. The
components selected for this study are those that
operators can directly control: the charging pumps,
the charging control valve (FV122 in Figure 1), and
the letdown BPV (PV145 in Figure 1). Specifically,
charging pump #1 is always operational, so the
controllable options included charging pumps #2 and
#3. Additionally, the control valves were tested in
10% increments, ranging from 10% to 100% open.
The fully closed state (0%) was not considered, as it
is not implemented in the simulator.
The accident scenario used in this study involved
a LOCA, with the assumption that a malfunction is
introduced 30 seconds after a normal situation, and
each mitigation action is initiated at 90 seconds. The
primary variable of interest is the PRZ water level,
while the input variables include charging flow,
letdown flow, reactor vessel water level, volume
control tank outlet flow, and the open state of the
charging control valve and letdown BPV.
4 RESULT
The causal inference method was utilized to quantify
the impact of PRZ water level on the operator’s
mitigation actions. First, the causal effect of charging
pump #2 is shown in Table 1 and Figure 2. It can be
seen in Table 1 that the PRZ water level averages
37.83% with the mitigation action, compared to
20.87% without it. The absolute effect is the water
level difference between these two scenarios, while
the relative effect represents the relative difference
compared to no mitigation. As a result, the use of
charging pump #2 shows an 81.31% increase in the
PRZ level compared to no mitigation action.
Additionally, the reactor shutdown time without
mitigation action is 267 seconds compared to 487
seconds after mitigation action.
In Figure 2, “y” is the data with mitigation action,
and “predicted” is the result of predicting the data
without mitigation action. In other words, the causal
impact method performs a counterfactual analysis by
predicting data without mitigation action based on data
with mitigation action. Additionally, the second row of
Figure 2 shows the absolute effect over time, and the
third row shows the cumulative effect over time.
Second, the results for the mitigation actions using
charging pump #3 are presented in Table 2 and Figure
3. The findings indicate that charging pumps #2 and
#3 have similar causal effects, with features
consistent within the margin of error. However, it can
be seen that each charging pump #2 and #3, which
should have the same treatment effect (i.e., same
reactor shutdown time), have different predictions
(i.e., different no mitigation action). This is caused by
uncertainty in the predictions.
Table 1: Causal effect on charging pump #2.
PRZ water level
(
%
)
Average Cumulative
Mitigation action 37.83 15018.9
No mitigation action 20.87 8283.57
A
b
solute effect 16.97 6735.33
Relative effect 81.31% 81.31%
Reactor shutdown time 487 seconds
Figure 2: Results of estimating causal effects over time on
charging pump #2.
Table 2: Causal effect on charging pump #3.
PRZ water level
(
%
)
Average Cumulative
Mitigation action 37.83 15018.9
No mitigation action 20.74 8232.47
A
b
solute effect 17.09 6786.45
Relative effect 82.44% 82.44%
Reactor shutdown time 487 seconds
Figure 3: Results of estimating causal effects over time on
charging pump #3.
Third, the effects of using both charging pumps
#2 and #3 simultaneously are illustrated in Table 3
ICINCO 2024 - 21st International Conference on Informatics in Control, Automation and Robotics
442
and Figure 4. The results show that the relative effect
of starting both pumps together is greater than starting
them separately. However, when charge pumps 2 and
3 are started together, the average PRZ level is lower
compared to when the charge pumps are started
individually. This is because the simultaneous start-
up of the charging pumps causes the abnormal
situation to persist longer, resulting in lower PRZ
water levels, illustrating the average fallacy.
Table 3: Causal effect on charging pumps #2 and #3.
PRZ water level
(
%
)
Avera
g
e Cumulative
Mitigation action 31.9 23477.15
No mitigation action 10.7 7871.57
A
b
solute effect 21.2 15605.58
Relative effect 198.25% 198.25%
Reactor shutdown time 826 seconds
Figure 4: Results of estimating causal effects over time on
charging pumps #2 and #3.
Fourth, the results related to the charging control
valve's opening state are shown in Figure 5. It is
observed that the effectiveness of the mitigation
actions is significantly reduced when the valve is
open below 70%. This indicates the necessity of
maintaining an opening state of 80% or more to
sustain the PRZ water level effectively.
Figure 5: Relative effect of charging control valve opening
state.
The detailed causal effect when the charging
control valve is 100% open is provided in Table 4 and
Figure 6.
Table 4: Causal effect on charging control valve 100%.
PRZ water level (%)
Average Cumulative
Miti
g
ation action 42.35 9061.96
No miti
g
ation action 32.27 6905.24
A
b
solute effect 10.08 2156.72
Relative effect 31.23% 31.23%
Reactor shutdown time 304 seconds
Figure 6: Causal effect of a 100% open charging control
valve.
Finally, the impact of the letdown BPV’s opening
state is depicted in Figure 7. Unlike the charging
control valve, there isn't a proportional relationship
between the opening state and effectiveness, but a
significant mitigation effect is observed at 100% open.
This is due to the fact that the charging control valve
exhibits a proportional increase in charging flow in
accordance with the opening state of the valve,
whereas the letdown BPV demonstrates a variation in
letdown flow as a consequence of the pressure
difference. A 100% opening of the letdown BPV
indicates that the pressure at the front and back are
equal, resulting in a letdown flow of 0. Consequently,
only when the letdown BPV is fully open is the
letdown flow 0, which yields a superior treatment
effect compared to other conditions.
Figure 7: Relative effect of letdown BPV opening state.
Recommendation of Optimal Mitigation Actions Using Causal Inference in LOCA Events at Nuclear Power Plants
443
Specifically, the causal effect of a fully open
letdown BPV is shown in Table 5 and Figure 8.
Table 5: Causal effect on letdown BPV 100%.
PRZ water level (%)
Average Cumulative
Miti
g
ation action 34.28 20262.02
No miti
g
ation action 20.5 12114.5
A
b
solute effect 13.79 8147.52
Relative effect 67.25% 67.25%
Reactor shutdown time 681 seconds
Figure 8: Causal effect of a 100% open letdown BPV.
In conclusion, the most effective mitigation action
for maintaining the PRZ water level involves the
simultaneous activation of charging pumps #2 and #3,
as evidenced by the cumulative absolute effect.
Additionally, the recommended actions based on the
results are: 1) simultaneous start-up of charging
pumps #2 and #3, 2) keeping the charging control
valve fully open at 100%, and 3) keeping the letdown
BPV fully open at 100%.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In accident situations at NPPs, operators perform
mitigation actions based on established procedures.
However, these procedures often lack specificity and
leave critical decisions to the operators. This study
aims to recommend optimal mitigation actions for
LOCA situations in NPPs.
We explored the application of causal inference to
evaluate and recommend optimal mitigation actions
during LOCA situations. By analyzing the effects of
various mitigation actions on the PRZ water level, we
identified the most effective strategies for managing
abnormal conditions.
The study utilized data collected from simulations
involving different combinations of charging pumps
and control valve settings. The results consistently
showed that the simultaneous activation of charging
pumps #2 and #3 led to the most significant
improvement in maintaining the PRZ water level,
evidenced by the highest cumulative absolute effect.
Additionally, keeping the charging control valve and
the letdown BPV fully open (100%) was found to be
particularly effective.
The findings suggest that adopting these specific
mitigation strategies can substantially enhance
reactor safety during LOCA events. By providing
operators with clear and quantifiable
recommendations, this approach helps ensure that the
most effective actions are taken promptly, reducing
the risk of reactor damage and improving overall
safety protocols in NPPs. This study lays the
groundwork for developing more detailed and
specific guidelines for emergency response,
potentially leading to better-prepared operators and
safer nuclear plant operations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by the Korea Institute of
Energy Technology Evaluation and Planning
(KETEP) grant funded by the Korea government
(MOTIE) (20224B10100130, Development of
operational state simulator for operating nuclear
power plant and commercialization technology for
artificial intelligence decision-making support system
to prevent human error in accident operation) and the
National Research Council of Science & Technology
(NST) grant by the Korea government (MSIT) (No.
GTL24031-000).
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