Side-Channel Analysis for Malicious Activity Detection Using Deep
Learning Techniques
Devajit Das
1a
, Manash Pratim Lahkar
1b
, Abhijit Gogor
2c
and Debojit Boro
1d
1
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Tezpur University, Tezpur, Assam, India
2
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Dibrugarh University, Assam, India
Keywords: Malware Detection, Side-Channel Analysis, Machine Learning, Deep Learning.
Abstract: The continued existence of malicious software constitutes a significant threat to network systems. This
necessitates the urgent need for the development of robust detection mechanisms. The rapid development of
malware variants frequently makes it challenging for traditional signature-based detection techniques. It has
been found that side-channel analysis of physical systems can disclose sensitive data, including the secret key
used for encryption, software activities, cryptographic operations, time-based features of the system, and data
processing patterns. The side-channel analysis involves obtaining data via unintentional leakage channels from
the physical system. The leakage channel may contain electromagnetic radiation, power consumption, timing
information, acoustic emissions, cache access patterns, and other side-channel leakage from hardware. In this
work, we employ deep-learning techniques with side-channel leakage from the hardware for identifying
malicious activities within a system. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique by deploying deep
neural networks for feature extraction and to recognize complicated correlations within data, specifically using
Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BiLSTM) networks. The findings of our experiments demonstrate
the accuracy with which recurrent neural networks classify malware instances. We achieved 95.97%, 95.08%,
and 92.46% accuracy, recall, and precision, respectively. Furthermore, we carried out real-time malware de-
tection experiments to test our strategy for protecting systems from cyber threats.
1
INTRODUCTION
The widespread existence of malicious software cre-
ates a serious risk to network security and integrity in
today’s digital world. Attackers can employ mal-
ware to gain unauthorized access, steal sensitive
information, disrupt operations, extort money, and
achieve various malicious goals (Tsalis et al., 2019;
Dutta et al., 2022; Alsmadi and Alqudah, 2021). A
key aspect of cybersecurity involves the detection
of
malware, as cyberattacks are becoming more fre-
quent and advanced. Due to the limitations of tradi-
tional signature-based methods in identifying evolv-
ing threats, new and promising solutions for detect-
ing malware have emerged (Islam and Shin, 2023;
Abusitta et al., 2021). Advanced deep learning tech-
niques combined with side-channel analysis could be
a viable solution for improving security in a physical
a
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4051-6410
b
https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7244-1653
c
https://orcid.org/0009-0000-4849-8264
d
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5512-0913
system (Yuan and Wu, 2021). Side-channel analy- sis
is extracting sensitive information, such as secret
keys utilized in the encryption process, passwords,
and software activities, from unintended channels of
physical systems (Hospodar et al., 2011; Xiao et al.,
2019). These unintentional channels can comprise the
power consumption of the physical system, electro-
magnetic radiation released by the device itself, and
side-channel leakage from the hardware that occurs
while the system is in use. Exploiting side channel
leakage from the hardware might be a good way to
sniff out malware. It allows harmful activities to be
identified without needing access to the actual code
(Maxwell et al., 2021). It is an unintentional means of
leaking information from hardware peripherals such
as fan speeds, core temperatures and memory usage.
The processing and analyzing of large volumes of
complex data has become more and deep learning is
Das, D., Lahkar, M. P., Gogor, A. and Boro, D.
Side-Channel Analysis for Malicious Activity Detection Using Deep Learning Techniques.
DOI: 10.5220/0013345500004646
Paper published under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Cognitive & Cloud Computing (IC3Com 2024), pages 123-129
ISBN: 978-989-758-739-9
Proceedings Copyright © 2025 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda.
123
increasingly employed in artificial intelligence. Cer-
tain neurons in deep neural networks are good fea-
ture extractors and capable of grasping the relation-
ships between complex variables. As a result, they
might be applied to identify tiny, non-linear patterns
in side-channel data that indicate malicious behavior
(Perin et al., 2022). It could be possible to more accu-
rately identify and stop harmful behaviour by leverag-
ing deep learning techniques for side-channel analy-
sis (Jin et al., 2020; Song et al., 2019). Consequently,
deep learning algorithms with side-channel analysis
can discern patterns and irregularities in the physical
system which might suggest malware or other perni-
cious activities are present (Song et al., 2019). Deep
learning in combination with feature selection tech-
niques can differentiate malware from normal benign
activity accurately (Alomari et al., 2023). The most
popular features to consider when analyzing such data
seems naturally fit for deep learning as it is able do
feature extraction and complex pattern detection
automatically.
Our primary goal in this research is to provide the
detection of malicious activities on computer systems
that are based on side-channel analysis and using ad-
vanced deep learning algorithms. In a brief, this work
makes the following contributions:
Preprocessing and training on public dataset with
various side-channel data from the hardware to
learn model weights for smooth learning.
Integrating the learned model seamlessly into ex-
isting malware detection systems while ensuring
compatibility and optimizing resource usage.
Carried out extensive testing to evaluate the in-
tegrated model in the malware detection system,
gaining valuable insights into its effectiveness.
The paper is arranged as follows: Section II pro- vides
an overview of relevant work in side-channel analysis
and malware detection. Section III presents our
dataset and methodology detailing the integra- tion of
side-channel analysis with deep learning tech- niques.
We state the experimental setup in Section IV. In
Section V, we describe the techniques and tests we
conducted to evaluate our approach’s effectiveness in
identifying malicious activities. Section VI con-
cludes by outlining possible fields of investigation,
discussing future work, and offering conclusions.
This abbreviations in Table 1 provides a quick ref-
erence for understanding the symbols used through-
out the paper.
2
RELATED WORK
The related work focuses on integrating deep learning
techniques with side-channel analysis to infer differ-
ent software activities and malicious behaviour from
Table 1: Abbreviations and their Meanings.
Abbreviation Description
RNN Recurrent Neural Network
CAN Controller Area Network
CNN Convolutional Neural Network
MLP Multi-Layer Perceptron
IDS Intrusion Detection System
CART Classification and Regression Trees
F1 Score Harmonic mean of precision and recall
HWiNFO64 System information capture tool
ED BiLSTM Encoder Decoder Bidirectional LSTM
HFSS High-Frequency Structure Simulator
EMSCA Electromagnetic Side-channel Attack
D Dataset
Preprocess(D) Preprocessing of dataset
D
train
Training dataset
D
test
Testing dataset
M
i
Model with different parameters
L Loss function
Metrics(M
i
, D
test
) Performance metrics
M
best
Best performing model
S System
Inject(S, Malware) Injection of malware into system
HWiNFO64 Application for information capture
Detect(M
best
, HWiNFO64) Detection of malware using best model
Time
detection
Time from malware injection to
detection
physical systems. The literature has a significant
number of publications on side-channel analysis for
inferring sensitive information that detects malware
and other harmful activities utilizing deep learning al-
gorithms.
Rastogi et al. (Rastogi and Kavun, 2021) explored
deep learning methods for side-channel analysis on
AES datasets from both hardware and software plat-
forms, including MLP, CNN, and RNN. Their study
focused on evaluating the performance of these mod-
els for secret key recovery and optimizing attack per-
formance when it comes to computation time and
SCA efficiency. They found CNNs to be more ef-
fective for analyzing software implementations, while
MLPs were better suited for hardware implementa-
tions of cryptographic algorithms. Haider et al. (Khan
et al., 2019) proposed distinct electromagnetic side-
channel signals monitoring solutions for crucial elec-
tronic and cyber-physical systems. They trained a
neural network model using electromagnetic emis-
sions from an uninfected device to produced normal
activity patterns. They monitored the target device’s
electromagnetic emanations remotely to detect devi-
ations indicating anomalous behavior. The system
successfully detected DDoS, and ransomware attacks
with high precision in practical evaluations on differ-
ent devices, showcasing the adaptability of the frame-
IC3Com 2024 - International Conference on Cognitive & Cloud Computing
124
work. Xun et al. (Xun et al., 2023) created an IDS
utilizing vehicle voltage signals to protect the secu-
rity of the CAN bus in intelligent connected vehi-
cles. They utilized a hybrid FeatureBagging-CNN
model to detect malicious intrusion without developer
documentation. Gao et al. (Gao et al., 2024) de-
signed a novel hardware trojan detection model con-
verting one-dimensional signals into two-dimensional
data to utilize frequency information in time-series
signals. They enhanced hardware trojan detection
using an improved ConvNeXt network, effectively
distinguishing and classifying different types of tro-
jan while improving accuracy, recall, F1-score, and
precision values. Maxwell et al. (Maxwell et al.,
2021) demonstrated the effectiveness of side-channel
information in detecting malware presence on com-
puting platforms. They achieved malware detection
accuracy exceeding 91% with a basic MLP model,
95.83% with a CNN model, and 90.91% with an RNN
model. Stergiopoulos et al. (Stergiopoulos et al.,
2018) introduced a machine learning-based network
traffic monitoring system that analyses TCP/IP packet
side-channel characteristics. Their solution achieves
a true positive detection rate of about 94% for differ-
entiating between harmful and regular traffic across a
wide spectrum of threats, successfully separating le-
gitimate traffic from various forms of malicious ac-
tivities. It is noticeable that on full-scale mixed forms
of harmful data, machine learning methods such as
CART and KNN obtained detection rates of 94.2%
and 93.4%, respectively. Sayakkara et al. (Sayakkara
et al., 2020) presented a system for activity identifica-
tion in forensic investigations that uses several filter-
ing techniques and machine learning algorithms to lo-
cate leaky frequency channels from high-dimensional
electromagnetic data. The method narrows 20,000
channels to 81 for real-time analysis. The accuracy
of activity prediction ranged from 0.9047 to 0.9395.
Ghosh et al. (Ghosh et al., 2022) proposed an An- sys
HFSS-based simulation framework for EM anal- ysis
of an integrated on-chip sensor to identify EM- SCA
and FIA (fault injection attacks). A simple ap- proach
for detecting incoming H-probes is also de- scribed,
which involves taking the absolute average of the
induced voltage for each encryption. Sayakkara et al.
(Sayakkara et al., 2019) used deep neural network-
based classifiers to classify cryptographic encryptions
on a Raspberry Pi 4 with above 95% accuracy, utiliz-
ing electromagnetic side-channel analysis.
This related work demonstrates a clear emphasis
on integrating side-channel analysis combined with
1
https://ieee-dataport.org/documents/side-channel-data-
malware-intrusion-detection
deep learning techniques to identify various soft-
ware activities and detect malicious activity, includ-
ing malware. Several studies explore electromag-
netic side-channel analysis, deep neural networks,
corporating deep learning for side-channel analysis
has several challenges, including data diversity, sys-
tem integration, and adversarial robustness. In this
work, we use multiple side-channel hardware sources
to detect malware.
3
DATASET & METHODOLOGY
3.1
Dataset
The dataset utilized in this study was obtained from
IEEEDataPort (Maxwell et al., 2020), comprising
data collected by the HWiNFO real-time monitoring
tool (hwi, ). HWiNFO offers detailed hardware per-
formance metrics, such as memory load, core fre-
quencies, and usage percentages. Two samples were
taken every second during the data recording and
then saved in CSV format. This dataset includes 57
samples: 29 malware and 28 benign. Each sample
consists of an eight-minute time-series output gen-
erated from HWiNFO captures. Samples were col-
lected from six distinct hardware PCs running the
Windows operating system on VMWare/VirtualBox
virtual machines. To ensure diversity in the dataset,
malware samples were collected randomly at inter-
vals of 90, 120, or 150 seconds. The benign soft-
ware operations simulated regular system behavior
before executing the malware. Samples were la-
beled to denote machine status and indicate benign
or malicious activity. Each file follows a naming
convention facilitating future research such as inves-
tigating model transferability. Malware categories
include ransomware, worms, trojan backdoors, spy-
ware, viruses, and rootkits. Benign samples mimic
routine software activities like web browsing, docu-
ment editing, gaming, and system maintenance. The
dataset comprises two folders: ”data raw” containing
original captures and ”data blend” with standardized
features derived from an inner join across all samples.
The latter ensures uniform feature representation fa-
cilitating classification tasks with 122 common fea-
tures and six label-type features.
3.2
Methodology
We initially obtained a dataset
1
called side-channel
Side-Channel Analysis for Malicious Activity Detection Using Deep Learning Techniques
125
data for malware detection from IEEEDataPort. Let
this dataset be D and it is subjected to preprocess-
ing techniques including data cleaning and column
and other machine-learning algorithms to classify
cryptographic encryptions, recover secret keys, and
identify anomalies in system behavior. However, in-
removal denoted as Preprocess(D). Two sets of pre-
processed data were created: training D
train
and test-
ing D
test
sets. Various models M
i
were trained using
D
train
, where i represents different architectures and
parameters such as BiLSTM and CNN. Model pa-
rameters are optimized during training to minimize a
loss function L, defined as L(M
i
, D
train
). After train-
ing, the models were tested on D
test
to see how ef-
fectively they performed in terms of accuracy, pre-
cision, recall, and F1-score, which are expressed as
Metrics(M
i
, D
test
). A comparative analysis was car-
ried out to determine the model M
best
with the highest
performance metrics. Subsequently, a system S was
developed based on the specifications consistent with
the dataset creation. The system was then subjected
to malware injection. We acquired the malware code
from “theZoo repository” on GitHub
2
(Nativ, ). This
is denoted as Inject(S, Malware), and dynamic infor-
mation from the HWiNFO64 application was fed into
the trained model M
best
in real-time, represented as
Detect(M
best
, HWiNFO64), to detect malware pres-
ence. The time elapsed from malware injection to de-
tection by the model M
best
was recorded for further
analysis. It is denoted as Time
detection
. This method-
ology is depicted in Figure 1 and Algorithm 1.
Training Module
Testing Module
Figure 1: Methodology.
4
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The experimental setup consists of various hardware
and software components to assess the efficacy of our
suggested technique for identifying malicious activity
in computer systems. Below are the details of the
2
https://github.com/ytisf/theZoo
system that was employed in the experiments:
Operating System: Windows
Algorithm 1 Malware Detection Methodology
1:
Step 1: Obtain dataset D from IEEEDataPort
2:
Step 2: Preprocess dataset: D
clean
Preprocess(D)
3:
Step 3: Divide the dataset into sets for testing
and training:
D
train
, D
test
Split(D
clean
)
4:
Step 4: For each model M
i
5:
Train model: M
i
Train(M
i
,
D
train
)
6:
Evaluate model:
Metrics(M
i
, D
test
)
7:
Step 5: Select best
model:
M
best
SelectBestModel(M
1
, M
2
, ..., M
n
)
8:
Step 6: Develop system: S DevelopSystem()
9:
Step 7: Inject malware into system:
Inject(S, Malware)
10:
Step 8: Monitor system using HWiNFO64:
Monitor(S, HWiNFO64)
11:
Step 9: Detect malware using best model:
Detect(M
best
, HWiNFO64)
12:
Step 10: Record time to detection:
Time
detection
Processor: Intel Core i7-9700 @ 3.00GHz
Storage: 512GB SSD
Memory: 32GB DDR4 RAM
Graphics Processing Unit (GPU):
NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080
Table 2: Specifications of the Virtual Machine Setup
Component Specifications
Virtualization Software Oracle VM VirtualBox
VM Operating System Ubuntu 20.04 LTS
VM Resources Processor: 4 virtual CPUs
Memory: 16GB
Storage: 100GB virtual disk
GPU: Integrated with host GPU for
accelerated performance
We used a virtual machine (VM) configuration
with specifications listed in Table 2 to ensure iso-
lated experiments and realistic environment simula-
tion. The development, training, and assessment of
our deep learning models were facilitated by the fol-
lowing software tools and libraries, as indicated in Ta-
ble 3:
Training set
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Test set
Model n
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5
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section outlines the experimental procedures
used to assess the effectiveness of our proposed
method for detecting malicious activity on computer
systems. We present an extensive description of the
model architecture and parameter setup that we em-
ployed in this research. The dataset utilized in our
research was sourced from the IEEEDataPort reposi-
tory ensuring accessibility and transparency. To pre-
pare for testing and training, we divided the dataset
into different subgroups. We used a stratified split-
ting strategy to maintain a balanced distribution of
normal and anomalous instances. We conducted ex-
periments using multiple models, such as BiLSTM,
CNNs, and RNNs, to determine how effectively dif-
ferent deep learning algorithms performed in identi-
fying malicious activities. Our main goal was to de-
termine the model architecture that could best capture
complex patterns indicative of malicious behavior.
Table 3: Software Tools and Libraries
Software Tools Description
Python 3.8 Primary programming language used for model
implementation. It is widely used in machine
learning, data science, and general-purpose pro-
gramming.
TensorFlow 2.4 Deep learning framework employed for con-
structing and training BiLSTM, CNN, and RNN
models. It supports GPU acceleration for faster
computation.
Keras High-level neural network API running on Ten-
sorFlow, utilized for defining and training model
architectures.
It simplifies the model-building
process.
NVIDIA CUDA 11.1 Parallel computing platform and programming
model that leverages GPU capabilities for model
training. It helps in utilizing hardware accelera-
tion for deep learning models.
cuDNN 8.0 GPU-accelerated library for deep neural net-
works, integrated with TensorFlow to enhance
performance. It accelerates deep learning oper-
ations.
HWiNFO Real-time monitoring tool used to capture de-
tailed system information during experiments. It
provides insights into hardware performance and
usage.
Among the architectures evaluated the BiLSTM
model emerged as the most promising choice because
of its inherent ability to capture temporal dependen-
cies and bidirectional context information. This archi-
tecture proved particularly adept at discerning subtle
anomalies within sequential data that make it appro-
priate for our detection task. The BiLSTM model was
configured with 256 LSTM units to ensure sufficient
representational capacity for capturing the intricacy of
the input data. To improve generalised performance
and reduce overfitting, 0.2 dropout layers were added.
A total of 200 epochs and a batch size of 128 samples
per iteration were used to train the BiLSTM model.
This training regimen facilitated gradual learning and
convergence toward an optimal solution.
Table 4: Comparison of Model Results with baseline
Model Accuracy Recall
Precision F1 Scor
e
BiLSTM 95.97% 95.08% 92.46% 93.75%
RN
N
93.49% 93% 94% 93%
MLP 50.9% 51.2% 49.45% 50.17%
ED BiLSTM 93.78% 96.32% 91.47% 93.83%
Maxwell 95.83% 93.9% 91.84% 92.68%
Table 4 depicts the comparison of model results with
different models, and it indicates that the BiL- STM
model achieved the highest accuracy of 95.97%. The
training and testing accuracy of the model is de-
picted in Figure 2. Having a recall rate of 95.08%,
the model confirmed its ability to classify the posi-
tive cases properly. It means that among all real posi-
tive instances, the model was able to identify 95.08%.
Moreover, the model had a precision of 92.46% and
was able to identify 92.46% of all predicted positive
instances. The F1 score of 93.75% shows a harmonic
mean between precision and recall which gives rea-
sonable performance for both of the indexes. In com-
parison, the RNN model had an accuracy value of
93.49% along with a recall rate 93% and precision of
94%.Even though this one is lower accurate that the
BiLSTM model, the RNN model displayed more
balanced performance in recall and precision and had
an F1 score of 93%. However, the MLP shows much
lower results compared to the recurrent models by all
measures. As most of the instances were inaccurately
classified, the accuracy percentage was 50.9%, and
both recall and precision were compromised at 51.2%
and 49.45%, respectively. This resulted in a low F1
score of 50.19%. Finally, the ED BiLSTM model per-
formed at 93.78% accuracy, with an impressive recall
of 96.32% and precision of 91.47%. The results more
effectively represent the ability of the model to locate
positive instances in the data set rather than minimize
false positives. As a result, it obtained an F1 score of
93.83% maintaining a balanced performance between
recall and precision. Overall, the evaluation results in-
dicate the superiority of recurrent models particularly
BiLSTM and ED BiLSTM in accurately classifying
instances compared to the MLP model. These find-
ings emphasize the potential benefits of RNNs.
Once our models were trained, and we identified the
best performing model, BiLSTM, we proceeded to
test its capabilities of real-time malware detec- tion.
We wanted to do it under realistic conditions, so we
Side-Channel Analysis for Malicious Activity Detection Using Deep Learning Techniques
127
created a system exactly identical to the sys- tems
which were used to create the dataset, including the
non-malware system and running services. After that
we mimicked the infection by running the mal- ware
on the system and using the model towards it. We also
obtained detailed information about the sys- tem, i.g.
hardware and software components used, via
HWiNFO64 and also fed this into our trained system
to provide it with context. The model detected that a
malware was run on the system in only 56 seconds.
As a result, we would like to note that our trained
model has practical use in protecting systems from
malicious software threats. In addition, our model
outperformed Maxwell’s work (Maxwell et al., 2021),
which stated an accuracy of 95.83%. In contrast, our
model performed slightly better at identifying mali-
cious activity, with an accuracy of 95.97%.
Figure 2: Training and testing accuracy.
6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
In conclusion, our experimental methodology in-
volved evaluating various deep learning architectures
for the detection of malicious activity within
computer systems. Through rigorous experimentation
and model evaluation, we identified the BiLSTM
model as the most effective in accurately classifying
instances of malware with a high accuracy of 95.97%,
recall rate of 95.08%, precision of 92.46%, and F1
score of 93.75%. The results obtained underscore the
significance of utilizing recurrent neural networks
particularly BiLSTM in handling sequential data and
capturing complex patterns indicative of malicious
behavior. Moreover, our real-time malware detection
experiment further validates the practical utility of the
BiLSTM model in safeguarding systems against
cyber threats.
In the future, our goal is to investigate more
characteristics and data sources to enhance the
function- ality and resilience of our detection system.
This in- cludes incorporating dynamic behavioral
analysis and network traffic data to improve
detection accuracy and resilience against evolving
malware variants. Ad- ditionally, we plan to
investigate techniques for enhancing the real-time
detection speed and scalability of our model ensuring
its effectiveness in large-scale deployment scenarios.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors are so grateful to the Department of Com-
puter Science and Engineering at Tezpur University
for providing us with the laboratory resources re-
quired to carry out our study.
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