Simulative Analysis of Multi-Agent Systems in Energy Systems: Impact
of Communication Networks
Malin Radtke
a
and Emilie Frost
b
Distributed Artificial Intelligence, OFFIS - Institute for Information Technology, Oldenburg, Germany
{malin.radtke, emilie.frost}@offis.de
Keywords:
Multi-Agent Systems, Simulative Analysis, Cyber-Physical Energy Systems, Communication Systems.
Abstract:
This paper addresses the growing use of Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) in power systems, particularly within
the context of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems (CPES). The reliance on Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) is critical for coordinating control and ensuring reliable information exchange. Disruptions
in the ICT system can degrade overall system performance. Given the complexity of these systems, systematic
testing and accurate simulation of MAS behavior under the influence of communication networks are essential
to ensure stability and security of supply. The paper provides a structured perspective on how to analyze
MASs performance under different communication conditions in CPES, offering recommendations based on
literature. It serves as a guide to understanding the challenges posed by the integration of ICT into power
systems, with guidelines that can be used and extended to evaluate and improve system performance.
1 INTRODUCTION
Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) have a wide range
of applications in various domains, including smart
grids, smart manufacturing, sensor networks, and in-
telligent transportation systems (Zhang et al., 2021).
Extensive literature highlights the use of MASs in
these fields, particularly in smart grids, where re-
searchers are exploring their broad potential (Mahela
et al., 2022).
As these applications evolve, the integration of In-
formation and Communication Technology (ICT) into
power systems is becoming increasingly critical. Tra-
ditional power systems, once reliant solely on phys-
ical infrastructure, are now increasingly integrated
with ICT, encompassing advanced control, com-
puting, and communication functions (Yohanandhan
et al., 2020). This integration has led to the devel-
opment of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems (CPES),
which merge physical components of the power grid
with cyber systems that monitor, control, and opti-
mize the performance of the entire network (Hasanuz-
zaman Shawon et al., 2019).
The reliance on ICT for coordinating control and
information exchange among agents in CPES means
that any disruption in communication networks can
lead to significant system degradation (Zhou et al.,
a
https://orcid.org/0009-0009-9902-1744
b
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4791-2333
2021). For instance, unexpected physical faults or
cyber attacks can compromise the system’s ability
to maintain stability, efficiency, and security (Zhang
et al., 2021). The complexity of these interactions
highlights the need for systematic testing and mod-
eling methods that can accurately simulate the be-
havior of MASs under various network conditions
(Yohanandhan et al., 2020).
Given these challenges, it is crucial to conduct a
thorough and systematic investigation of the complex
interactions between MASs and the communication
networks within CPES. This investigation should fo-
cus on understanding how communication networks
influence the overall performance and reliability of
MASs. Moreover, there is a growing need to develop
robust strategies and architectures that can mitigate
these risks and ensure the secure operation of CPES
(Wang and Govindarasu, 2020a).
In this context, this position paper introduces a
structured methodology for simulating and analyzing
MASs in CPES, with an emphasis on how communi-
cation networks impact their performance and relia-
bility. Rather than delivering definitive solutions, this
paper offers a structured perspective on how such an
analysis might be conducted. Specifically, the mor-
phological box presented herein is not intended to be
prescriptive, but rather serves as a theoretical guide
based on current literature, reflecting one possible ap-
proach to tackling these complex issues.
Radtke, M. and Frost, E.
Simulative Analysis of Multi-Agent Systems in Energy Systems: Impact of Communication Networks.
DOI: 10.5220/0013241400003890
Paper published under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence (ICAART 2025) - Volume 1, pages 523-530
ISBN: 978-989-758-737-5; ISSN: 2184-433X
Proceedings Copyright © 2025 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda.
523
By examining various parameters and scenarios
that impact MAS performance, this paper seeks to
provide a conceptual framework to understand and
address the challenges posed by the integration of ICT
in modern power systems.
In particular, the paper includes research on re-
lated work for analysis of MASs, as discussed in sec-
tion 2. In section 3, selected literature is used to illus-
trate the basis for the proposed morphological box,
which demonstrates key objectives and design deci-
sions critical to such a simulative analysis. Finally,
the implications of these findings are discussed and
concluded in section 4.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we categorize and identify contri-
butions relevant to the simulative analysis of MASs
in CPES under the influence of communication net-
works. Additionally, we highlight limitations in ex-
isting related work, that provide a foundation for the
more detailed analysis guidance.
Agent-Based Applications in CPES.
Hasanuzzaman Shawon et al. (2019) and Mahela
et al. (2022) provide comprehensive reviews of
agent-based applications in smart grids, focusing
on MAS concepts, design, challenges, and tech-
nological frameworks. Agents are categorized
based on their roles in energy management (e.g.,
pricing, scheduling) and on ensuring reliability
and security (e.g., fault handling). However, they
do not delve into how communication network
issues impact system performance, particularly
under fault conditions or cyber attacks. This
paper builds on their insights by specifically
addressing these gaps through the proposed
simulative analysis guideline.
Safety and Security Analysis in MASs. Zhang
et al. (2021) provide an in-depth survey on
the safety and security of MASs, with a focus
on fault estimation, detection, diagnosis, and
fault-tolerant control. While this research offers a
strong theoretical framework, its abstract nature
limits practical applicability, particularly in
energy systems. The focus is primarily on fault
detection rather than simulative investigations
that explore MAS behavior under real-world
fault and attack scenarios. Yohanandhan et al.
(2020) review various modeling and simulation
methods related to cybersecurity in CPES. This
includes a detailed overview of cyber attack types,
such as Denial of Service (DoS), Malware, and
Man-in-the-Middle attacks, and their potential
impacts on physical systems, including stability
and economic factors. However, the review
remains general, lacking specific guidelines or
best practices for analyzing MASs under the
influence of communication networks.
Research Gap. The reviewed literature provides
valuable foundations for understanding MASs in
CPES, safety and security concerns, and the role
of ICT. However, there are notable gaps, particu-
larly in the simulative analysis of MAS behavior
under the influence of communication networks.
Existing research tends to focus either on ab-
stract, theoretical concepts or general cybersecu-
rity in CPES without providing specific guidelines
or practical approaches for investigating MASs in
the context of energy systems. This position paper
aims to fill these gaps by proposing a comprehen-
sive guide for simulative analysis, addressing the
key objectives and design decisions necessary for
robust and reliable MAS operation in CPES.
3 SIMULATIVE ANALYSIS OF
MAS
The analysis of MASs in CPES necessitates a com-
prehensive understanding of the role communication
networks play in determining the performance and be-
havior of these agent systems. Communication net-
works, which serve as the critical infrastructure for
data exchange between agents, can significantly im-
pact system stability, reliability, and efficiency. To in-
vestigate these impacts, a simulative analysis offers a
robust approach to assess how variations in commu-
nication conditions, such as latency, packet loss, or
network failures, influence MAS performance.
This section presents a structured methodology
for conducting a simulative analysis of MASs under
the influence of communication networks in CPES.
Drawing on insights from existing literature, the guid-
ance is divided into several key areas:
the definition of analysis objectives,
the specification of system requirements and com-
munication threats,
and the design of the simulation study itself.
Using a morphological box (see Figure 1), we cate-
gorize critical parameters that affect MASs in CPES,
providing a comprehensive guideline to systemati-
cally assess the interplay between MASs and com-
munication networks. The aforementioned key areas
and parameters are presented and detailed below, as
shown in Figure 1.
ICAART 2025 - 17th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence
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Analysis
Objective
(Analysis)
Metrics
Multi-agent system in Cyber-physical Energy Systems
Analysis of MAS-behavior under
communication network influence
may be violated through
Requirements
lead to
Threats
Objective
(MAS)
Fault location Fault isolation
Fault reaction
Monitoring
Control
Security Safety
ReliabilityPerformanceFunctionality Resilience
Robustness
Autonomy
Cyber attacksCommunication system influences
Faults
Deception
attacks
Communication
Modeling Method
Detailed Simulation
Abstract application
representation
Communication system
parameter
Power system parameter
(Control) Algorithm
parameter
Illustrative example
Comprehensive
parameter analysis
Normal
operation
Graph-based model
Evaluate proposed architecture for
fault location/isolation/reaction
Study
Effects
Design
Baseline and
boundaries
Power system
topology & configuration
Communication system
topology & configuration
Denial-of-Service
attack
...
Hardware
component faults
Failures
Increased
message volume
Traffic Delays
Packet losses
Agent system
configurations
...
Availability Integrity
Figure 1: Overview of important parameters in the simulative analysis of MASs in CPES.
3.1 Analysis: Objective
The analysis objective addresses the purpose of con-
ducting the simulative analysis itself. It defines what
the analysis aims to achieve, such as understanding
how communication network conditions affect MAS
behavior or assessing the efficacy of fault-handling ar-
chitectures.
One key objective when conducting a simulative anal-
ysis may be to understand how MAS behavior and
performance are influenced by different communica-
tion network conditions. This process assists in the
identification of potential vulnerabilities and the opti-
mization of the system. It includes investigating the
impact of communication network performance met-
rics such as latency and packet drops, as well as fail-
ures or attacks on power system applications.
For example, Xiahou et al. (2021) studied the reli-
ability of power systems under random delay attacks,
while Radtke et al. (2023) investigated the influence
of a realistic communication network on the power
system applications redispatch and voltage control
under varying communication network conditions.
Secondly, the evaluation of the proposed architec-
tures for fault detection, isolation, and reaction pro-
vides valuable insights into the effectiveness of MASs
Simulative Analysis of Multi-Agent Systems in Energy Systems: Impact of Communication Networks
525
in handling communication faults and cyber attacks.
For instance, Wang and Govindarasu (2020a) eval-
uated their proposed anomaly detection mechanism,
while Albarakati et al. (2023) demonstrated the effi-
cacy of adaptive protection mechanisms. Other stud-
ies, such as the work of Ilyes et al. (2019), focused
on frameworks to detect and reconfigure systems af-
ter cyber attacks and physical faults.
3.2 System: Objective
In contrast to the objective of analysis, the objective of
the system focuses on the intended goals of the MAS
within the context of the energy system. This subsec-
tion highlights the primary functions that the MAS
is designed to perform, such as energy management
or fault detection and reaction (Mahela et al., 2022),
and emphasizes how these specific system objectives
shape the focus of the analysis.
If the primary objective of the MAS is related to
monitoring and control functions in the power grid
(such as in Xiahou et al. (2021); Yang et al. (2020)),
the analysis would usually focus primarily on under-
standing the MAS behavior under the influence of
communication networks.
Conversely, when the objective of the agent sys-
tem lies more in fault location, isolation, and reaction
(such as in Albarakati et al. (2023); Ilyes et al. (2019);
Abdelhamid et al. (2022)), the analysis shifts towards
evaluating proposed architectures for handling com-
munication faults and responding to cyber attacks. In
this case, the focus is on testing the effectiveness of
the agent’s ability to detect, isolate, and recover from
faults in communication networks in the analysis.
3.3 System: Requirements
In the context of energy systems, different require-
ments must be met by MASs. Depending on the ob-
jective in the development of the MAS and the appli-
cation, these requirements differ. Many approaches
consider security as a requirement for MASs. Ac-
cording to Hines et al. (2014), security in the context
of power systems means that no component will cause
the system to violate the operating limits. In the con-
text of smart grids, security often refers to cyber secu-
rity, as designing communication systems resistant to
attempted cyber attacks. This is also done in the liter-
ature, as many approaches consider security of MASs
against cyber attacks (Ilyes et al., 2019; Zhou et al.,
2021; Wang and Govindarasu, 2020a; Choi et al.,
2020) or faults (Abdelhamid et al., 2022). Accord-
ing to Hines et al. (2014), security is often associated
with robustness, meaning that a secure system is ro-
bust against attacks or failures. Therefore, similar to
security, robustness is also required for MASs. Al-
barakati et al. (2023) define robustness as the system’s
ability to cope with disturbances while maintaining
functionality. Thus, approaches in the literature in-
vestigate the robustness of their MAS regarding faults
and attacks, for example, to ensure that the system is
robust under packet drops or time delays (Oest et al.,
2021; Yang et al., 2020).
Additionally, reliability is considered a require-
ment for MASs, which can be defined as continuous
delivery of a correct service (Sanislav et al., 2017).
The actual service depends on the application of the
MAS, as service availability, latency, duration of out-
ages (Hines et al., 2014) or the delivery of electric-
ity (Arghandeh et al., 2016). In the literature, relia-
bility of MASs is considered regarding cyber attacks
(Fang et al., 2017; Sanislav et al., 2017; Choi et al.,
2020; Oest et al., 2021) or evaluated for distributed
approaches (Kou et al., 2021). Similar to the previ-
ous metrics, functionality is a requirement for MASs
(Zhu et al., 2019). Robust systems are maintaining
functionality during disturbances (Arghandeh et al.,
2016). However, the definition of functionality is also
depending on the application and the system itself.
The performance is often analyzed as a requirement
for MASs, however, the interpretation depends on the
use case. For different applications, different met-
rics are defined, such as solution quality (Oest et al.,
2021). Furthermore, resilience, meaning the ability of
a system to recover from a failure (Hines et al., 2014)
is required in MASs (Wang and Govindarasu, 2020a).
This includes for example service restoration (Ab-
delhamid et al., 2022). Other requirements are also
possible, depending on the application and objective.
These include for example autonomy (Sanislav et al.,
2017; Oest et al., 2021), safety (Sanislav et al., 2017;
Ilyes et al., 2019), availability (Fang et al., 2017; Kou
et al., 2021) or integrity (Fang et al., 2017).
3.4 System: Threats
The aforementioned requirements that apply to MASs
in energy systems may be violated through a variety
of threats concerning the impact of the communica-
tion network on the system. These threats can be clas-
sified into two main categories: those that affect the
system under normal operating conditions or in the
event of technical faults, and those that are of a cyber
attack nature.
In examining the impact of communication net-
works under normal operational conditions, it is pos-
sible to consider the integration of packet drops and
packet delays in message dispatch (Yang et al., 2020),
ICAART 2025 - 17th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence
526
as well as the evaluation of system behavior under
the influence of different communication technolo-
gies (Oest et al., 2021). Furthermore, the influence of
technical faults, such as communication link or base
station failure, may also be analyzed (Abdelhamid
et al., 2022; Oest et al., 2021).
Cyber attacks have recently been perceived as par-
ticularly threatening and therefore have also been an-
alyzed regarding their impact on MASs. Fang et al.
(2017) regard cyber attacks in general, while other
authors focus on specific attacks, as deception at-
tacks (Wang and Govindarasu, 2020a). Often inves-
tigated are DoS attacks, as the effects of such an at-
tack can take many forms, such as system failures or
overloads (Wang and Govindarasu, 2020a; Albarakati
et al., 2023). Other attacks deal with false data be-
ing transferred via the system. As this also impacts
a MAS, these types of attacks are extensively inves-
tigated in the scientific literature. Most of the time,
false data injection attacks are considered in this case
(Ilyes et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2021; Choi et al., 2020)
or man-in-the-middle attacks (Sanislav et al., 2017).
Other approaches investigate false data or data manip-
ulations in specific areas, such as alert manipulation
attacks (Zhou et al., 2021) or configuration change at-
tacks (Sanislav et al., 2017).
3.5 System: Effects
While some approaches investigate the threat itself,
others focus on the effect of such threats. Differ-
ent threats have different effects on the system. The
investigated effects are hardware component faults
due to attacks (Sanislav et al., 2017), failures (Wang
and Govindarasu, 2020b), increased message volume
(Frost. et al., 2024), traffic (Radtke et al., 2023), de-
lays or packet losses (Oest et al., 2021; Frost et al.,
2020; Yang et al., 2020; Xu et al., 2021). Several of
these effects are caused by multiple threats, such as
failures or attacks, as failures of assets can be caused
by environment or denial of service attacks.
3.6 Study: Baseline and Boundaries
Establishing the baseline and boundaries for the sim-
ulative analysis is a critical first step to accurately as-
sess the behavior of MASs within CPES in a simula-
tion study. This process involves defining the initial
configuration of the system, agent behavior, charac-
teristics of the communication network, and the topol-
ogy of the power system. By setting a clear baseline,
the analysis can systematically vary different param-
eters to assess the system performance under a range
of conditions.
The baseline should include a well-defined model
of the MAS, specifying the number and type of
agents, and the specific objectives they are designed
to achieve (e.g., fault detection, optimization, or con-
trol). For example, studies such as Sanislav et al.
(2017) and Oest et al. (2021) include detailed config-
urations of agent systems and communication tech-
nologies, which serve as starting points for their anal-
yses.
The topology and configuration of the communi-
cation system are also critical components of the base-
line. This includes defining communication technolo-
gies and network architectures. Variations in commu-
nication conditions, such as the introduction of delays
or failures, can then be explored based on this base-
line configuration. For instance, Frost et al. (2024)
assessed the influence of a wired communication net-
work with ring and star topologies in three distinct
scenarios: an ideal communication environment, an
unimpaired scenario, and an attack situation.
Finally, the power system topology and configu-
ration must be specified, including details about the
physical grid model, such as the number of buses,
feeders, and generators. The baseline might be based
on real-world systems, such as the distribution feeder
used in Albarakati et al. (2023) or standard models
such as the IEEE 9-bus system (Ilyes et al., 2019).
By carefully defining the baseline and boundaries,
the analysis can ensure that any variations introduced
in the scenarios (whether related to the agent system,
communication conditions, or power system configu-
rations) are meaningfully compared against a consis-
tent reference point. This approach facilitates a com-
prehensive understanding of how different parameters
influence the overall performance and reliability of
the MAS within CPES.
3.7 Study: Communication Modeling
Method
An important aspect of simulative analysis is de-
termining the method for communication modeling.
Different approaches exist, each varying in complex-
ity, accuracy, and suitability depending on the purpose
of the analysis. The choice of method affects the level
of detail that can be captured regarding the influence
of communication networks on MASs in CPES.
One common approach is the integration of Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs). This method mod-
els basic communication parameters such as delays
or packet losses using stochastic distributions, simu-
lating network influence without detailed network be-
havior. While this approach is simpler and less com-
putationally expensive, it may lack the realism re-
Simulative Analysis of Multi-Agent Systems in Energy Systems: Impact of Communication Networks
527
quired to model complex interactions. For instance,
Xiahou et al. (2021) use this approach to integrate
random delay attacks into their analysis, providing a
general understanding of how such disruptions affect
system performance.
A more comprehensive approach is a detailed sim-
ulation conducted using specialized communication
network simulation frameworks. This method allows
for modeling specific communication technologies,
protocols, and phenomena like interference, provid-
ing a more accurate and realistic representation of
network behavior. However, it comes with draw-
backs, such as increased complexity, higher compu-
tational overhead, and potentially costly licenses for
simulation tools. Studies like Wang and Govindarasu
(2020a) and Oest et al. (2021) demonstrate this ap-
proach, leveraging detailed simulations to evaluate
performance under varying network conditions.
Alternatively, the abstract application representa-
tion method focuses on the effects of the communi-
cation network on the messages exchanged by agents,
without explicitly modeling the network itself. This
approach simplifies the analysis by assuming certain
conditions, such as attack probabilities or transmis-
sion errors, and analyzing their impact on system per-
formance. This method is used in studies like Fang
et al. (2017), where attack probabilities are assumed
to study system behavior, and in Albarakati et al.
(2023), which models cyber attacks in data transmis-
sion without detailed network modeling.
Some studies also use graph-based models to rep-
resent communication networks. In this method,
nodes in the graph represent communication nodes
(e.g., agents), and edges represent communication
links, which may be weighted based on network prop-
erties such as bandwidth or latency. This approach
provides a flexible way to analyze network topologies
and their impact on communication. For example, Es-
lami et al. (2022) and Yang et al. (2020) use graph-
based models to represent and simulate network per-
formance, particularly in scenarios involving packet
drops or communication delays.
3.8 Study: Metrics
The selection of appropriate metrics is a critical com-
ponent of study design, as it defines how the perfor-
mance of the MAS under the influence of the com-
munication network will be evaluated. These metrics
should be aligned with the overall objectives of the
analysis and tailored to the specific scenario under in-
vestigation. Typically, the metrics can be categorized
based on their origin: communication system param-
eters, power system parameters, and MAS or control
algorithm performance.
The parameters of the communication system are
crucial to assess how the network influences MAS
performance. These metrics typically focus on net-
work delays, latency, and message losses. For ex-
ample, Xiahou et al. (2021) measure delay times to
evaluate the effects of random delay attacks, while
Oest et al. (2021) examine end-to-end latency in dif-
ferent communication technologies to assess overall
communication performance.
The parameters of the power system provide in-
sight into how the grid itself is affected by commu-
nication issues or cyber attacks. Metrics such as cur-
rent levels, breaker status during disruptions, or power
output of generators are often used to evaluate grid
stability and resilience. Studies like Albarakati et al.
(2023) measure breaker status during cyber attacks,
while Yang et al. (2020) track the optimized power
output of generators to assess system performance un-
der various network conditions.
Agent system and control algorithm parameters
are essential for evaluating how well the agents or
control algorithms perform within the system (under
the influence of the communication network). Met-
rics in this category might include fault location ac-
curacy, failure rates, and optimization run-times. For
instance, Wang and Govindarasu (2020a) evaluate
anomaly detection performance, and Albarakati et al.
(2023) measure fault location accuracy. Oest et al.
(2021) focus on metrics like negotiation times and
error rates for optimization tasks, while Ilyes et al.
(2019) track system reliability and failure rates.
3.9 Study: Design
The design of the study is important for shaping the
insights that can be derived from the simulative anal-
ysis. Two common approaches are illustrative case
studies and comprehensive parameter analysis.
An illustrative example or case study is often used
to showcase the behavior of the system under a spe-
cific set of conditions. These case studies are typically
designed around predefined scenarios, such as cyber
attacks, communication faults, or system failures, and
are meant to provide qualitative insights into the sys-
tem’s performance in specific contexts. For example,
Fang et al. (2017) explore ve different attack sce-
narios, while Wang and Govindarasu (2020a) focus
on a single attack scenario to evaluate the system’s
response. Similarly, Albarakati et al. (2023) present
three different scenarios, and Zhou et al. (2021) eval-
uate different fault and attack types. These case stud-
ies offer targeted insights, but may not capture the full
range of system behaviors.
ICAART 2025 - 17th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence
528
In contrast, a comprehensive parameter analysis
systematically explores how changes in key parame-
ters affect system performance across a wider range of
conditions. This approach involves running multiple
simulations while varying parameters such as agent
system size, network conditions, or disturbance inten-
sity to capture a more holistic understanding of sys-
tem dynamics. For instance, Kou et al. (2021) con-
duct an extensive analysis of reliability metrics, and
Oest et al. (2021) investigate how different agent sizes
and communication technologies impact system per-
formance in various scenarios.
Both approaches have their advantages. Case
studies are ideal for demonstrating the system re-
sponse to specific conditions, while comprehensive
parameter analysis allows for a more generalized un-
derstanding of system behavior under a range of dis-
turbances. The choice between these approaches
should be aligned with the objective of the analysis
and the level of detail required for the analysis.
4 DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
A principal conclusion to be drawn from this guide-
line for simulative analysis is the necessity for
MASs to be communication-aware. This implies that
decision-making algorithms in energy systems should
be constructed in a manner that enables them to func-
tion with incomplete or delayed information. The
concrete definition of requirements for the system al-
lows the identification of potential impairments re-
sulting from the influence of the simulated communi-
cation network. This enables analyzing the system’s
behavior under adverse conditions (e.g., due to cyber
attacks) and the implementation of suitable security
mechanisms. The use of appropriate detection mech-
anisms allows for the mitigation of faults and attacks
before system stability is compromised. Investiga-
tions into the scalability of such systems also benefit
from the simulation analysis proposed, as these stud-
ies highlight the importance of considering potential
(communication) bottlenecks in large systems. Fur-
thermore, simulative analysis of MASs under influ-
ences of the communication network assists in select-
ing appropriate communication technologies and pro-
tocols by evaluating and comparing diverse options.
Although the guideline provides a solid founda-
tion, it may not cover all possible scenarios or sys-
tem configurations and must be applied to real-world
use cases. Users are encouraged to expand and adapt
the guideline based on their own needs, incorporating
additional parameters, or exploring new technologies,
such as emerging cyber threats and communication
technologies.
In summary, this paper serves as a guide for under-
standing and addressing the challenges posed by the
interconnections of ICT and power system, and pro-
poses a structured approach to evaluating the perfor-
mance of MASs under communication conditions in
CPES in a simulative analysis. Recommendations are
given on what aspects should be considered in such an
analysis, based on the current literature. Future work
may include examples of the practical application of
these guidelines to new research projects.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This manuscript is based on a project funded by the
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate
Action as part of the “Edge Data Economy” tech-
nology program. We gratefully acknowledge our
”DEER” project partners’ support in this research.
The authors would like to thank the German Fed-
eral Government, the German State Governments,
and the Joint Science Conference (GWK) for their
funding and support as part of the NFDI4Energy con-
sortium. The work was partially funded by the Ger-
man Research Foundation (DFG) 501865131 within
the German National Research Data Infrastructure
(NFDI, www.nfdi.de).
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