Earnings Management Practices During the Covid-19 Pandemic: A

Comparative Study of Jordanian Family and Non-Family Controlled

Firms

Rasmi Meqbel

and Hanady Qamoom

Department of A Zarqa, Jordan

Rasmi.meqbel@hu.edu.jo, emfahed2020@gmail.com

Keywords: Family Ownership, Earnings Management, Covid-19, Agency Problem, Socioemotional Wealth Theory.

Abstract: This study aims to examine the association between family ownership and earnings management before and

during the Covid-19 pandemic. Drawing upon the socioemotional wealth and agency theories, the research

suggests that family-controlled firms might resort to earnings management as a strategic measure during the

Covid-19 crisis to safeguard their endowment and legacy. To test the hypotheses, a panel data analysis is

conducted using STATA software on a comprehensive sample of companies listed on the Amman Stock

Exchange spanning from 2015 to 2022. Earnings management is measured using the Performance-matched

Accrual Earnings Management model as proposed by Kothari et al. (2005). The findings show a significant

insight into the behavior of family-controlled firms. Specifically, in the years leading up to the Covid-19

outbreak, these firms displayed a reduced inclination to engage in earnings manipulation. Conversely, within

the Covid-19 pandemic, the outcomes indicate an increased likelihood of family firms adopting earnings

management strategies. Practical implications include guiding family business decisions in challenging times,

while theoretical insights contribute to our understanding of how family ownership influences financial

strategies during crises. Societally, the study highlights the significance of transparent financial reporting for

stakeholder trust and informs policy considerations to support family firms' resilience during economic

disruptions.

1 INTRODUCTION

Earnings management (EM) has been widely studied,

particularly following corporate scandals that

exposed its negative impact on financial reporting

integrity (Ghaleb et al., 2021; El-Feel et al., 2024).

Financial reports are essential for stakeholders, yet

managers may manipulate earnings through

discretionary accounting choices, compromising

reliability (Ali et al., 2022). Prior research has

primarily examined EM through accruals or real

activities separately (Azizah, 2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted economies

worldwide, including Jordan, creating financial

challenges for businesses (Cimini et al., 2025; ASE

Annual Report, 2020). Economic downturns often

incentivize managers to use accounting discretion to

influence reported earnings (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).

While some studies suggest COVID-19 enabled

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1501-3085

earnings manipulation to sustain profitability (Albitar

et al., 2021; Ozili, 2021), findings remain

inconclusive, especially in developing economies

with high ownership concentration like Jordan (Ali et

al., 2022; Rahman et al., 2022). Examining EM

practices in Jordanian firms during the pandemic is

thus essential to understanding COVID-19’s effects

in this context.

Family ownership plays a key role in corporate

governance and financial reporting quality (Ghaleb et

al., 2021). Family firms may engage in EM to protect

socio-emotional wealth during crises, yet research on

this relationship, particularly in Jordan, remains

limited (Ghaleb et al., 2021). Moreover, prior studies

predate Jordan’s Corporate Governance Code (JCGC)

update and the COVID-19 crisis, highlighting the

need for further investigation.

This study addresses the question: How has the

COVID-19 pandemic influenced earnings

Meqbel, R. and Qamoom, H.

Earnings Management Practices During the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Comparative Study of Jordanian Family and Non-Family Controlled Firms.

DOI: 10.5220/0013465500003956

Paper published under CC license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Finance, Economics, Management and IT Business (FEMIB 2025), pages 251-258

ISBN: 978-989-758-748-1; ISSN: 2184-5891

251

management in Jordanian family and non-family

firms? It examines accrual-based EM in these firms

from 2015 to 2022. The research contributes by (1)

uncovering profit management practices in Jordanian

family and non-family firms post-COVID-19, (2)

providing insights for global investors interested in

Jordan’s corporate environment, and (3) being among

the first to empirically assess the pandemic’s impact

on financial reporting in Jordan. These findings offer

valuable implications for investors, regulators, and

policymakers navigating financial decision-making

during crises.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Managers can manipulate earnings through

accounting discretion and estimates, facilitated by the

flexibility of accounting standards (Healy & Wahlen,

1999). During economic crises such as COVID-19,

firms may engage in earnings management to

mitigate financial distress, enhance reported

performance, and maintain a positive market

perception (Albitar et al., 2021; Cimini et al., 2025;

Ozili & Arun, 2020). The pandemic presented

opportunities for such practices, particularly in

economies with concentrated ownership structures

and weaker investor protections, such as Jordan

(Alzoubi, 2016). Prior research suggests that

managers engage in both upward and downward

earnings management during crises. While some

manipulate earnings upward to maintain stakeholder

confidence (Lisboa & Kacharava, 2018), others

suppress reported earnings to justify poor

performance or avoid regulatory scrutiny (Hamza &

Zaatir, 2021). However, studies on earnings

management during COVID-19 remain inconclusive,

producing mixed results (Ali et al., 2022).

Family ownership plays a critical role in shaping

financial reporting practices, particularly during

periods of economic uncertainty (Ghaleb et al., 2020).

Family-controlled firms often exhibit greater

resilience and adaptability, leveraging operational

flexibility to sustain performance (Le Breton-Miller

& Miller, 2021). Crédit Suisse (2021) reported that

family enterprises achieved higher profitability and

growth rates during and after crises. Moreover,

evidence suggests that family firms experienced less

market capitalization loss than non-family firms

during the pandemic (Amore et al., 2022).

Lisboa (2017) found that family firms tend to

engage in more accrual-based earnings management

during crises, particularly when financially unstable,

raising concerns about lower information quality. Eng

et al. (2019) highlighted differences in real earnings

management across countries, with US family firms

engaging in more earnings manipulation post-crisis,

while Chinese family firms exhibited weaker post-

crisis earnings management effectiveness. These

findings, though predating COVID-19, indicate that

family firms respond uniquely to economic shocks.

Further research highlights family firms’ strategic

adaptability, with Le Breton-Miller & Miller (2022)

noting that they often restructure operations to

navigate crises effectively. Similarly, Amore et al.

(2022) found that Italian family firms outperformed

non-family firms in market performance and

profitability, particularly those with fewer family

stakeholders. While family firms may benefit from

efficient resource management and reduced revenue

declines, Paiva et al. (2019) caution against treating

all family firms alike when assessing earnings

management incentives.

Rahman et al. (2022) found that prior to COVID-

19, Chinese-listed non-family firms engaged in

higher real earnings management than family firms.

However, during the pandemic, both family and non-

family firms increased their use of real earnings

management. In countries with weak investor

protection and high ownership concentration, such as

Jordan, family-controlled firms may exploit earnings

management to prioritize majority shareholders at the

expense of minority investors (Alzoubi, 2016; Paiva

et al., 2019). Given Jordan’s corporate structure—

where family businesses dominate the market—such

behavior is particularly relevant for understanding

financial reporting dynamics during economic crises.

The impact of family ownership on earnings

management during COVID-19 is twofold. Some

argue that family firms manipulate earnings to

mitigate crisis effects and sustain performance

(Albitar et al., 2021; Ozili & Arun, 2020), leveraging

adaptability and innovation (Le Breton-Miller &

Miller, 2021). Others suggest downward

manipulation to obscure poor performance or evade

political risks (Hamza & Zaatir, 2021). Given the

limited research on earnings management in family-

controlled firms during COVID-19, findings remain

mixed (Ali et al., 2022), underscoring the complexity

of family ownership’s role in financial reporting

during crises.

Based on the existing literature, the following

hypothesis is proposed:

H1: Jordanian family controlled firms are expected to

be more inclined to engage in AEM activities than

FEMIB 2025 - 7th International Conference on Finance, Economics, Management and IT Business

252

non-family enterprises before the COVID-19

pandemic.

2.1 Sample Selection and Data Source

The study sample consisted of non-financial

Jordanian companies listed for public trading on the

Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) between 2015 and

2022. Data were collected from multiple sources,

primarily sourced from the companies' annual reports

and the Securities Depository Centre. The data for

AEM were obtained from publicly available annual

reports of the sampled firms on the ASE website. The

sample period was divided into two distinct periods:

the pre-pandemic era from 2015 to 2019, during

which the pandemic had not yet occurred, and the

pandemic period from 2020 to 2022.

2.2 Variable Measurement

2.2.1 Dependent Variable (Earnings

Management)

Accrual earnings management models (AEM)

Total accruals include discretionary and non-

discretionary components. Discretionary accruals

stem from accounting choices to manage earnings,

reflecting opportunistic EM practices. Non-

discretionary accruals arise naturally within a period

with minimal managerial influence (Ronen & Yaari,

2008). Estimating discretionary accruals involves two

steps. The first is to identify total accruals and the

second to employ a model to estimate discretionary

accruals. To measure total accrual, this study follows

the cash flow approach, as recommended by Hribar

and Collins (2002), which is calculated as below;

𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶



= 𝑁𝐼



− 𝑂𝐶𝐹



(1)

where:

TACC is the total accruals; NI

is the net income; OCF

is operating cash flow.

Discretionary accrual (DACCit), which is the proxy

to detect EM (AEM), represents the residuals of

Kothari et al.’s model (Kothari et al., 2005):

𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶

𝑇𝐴

,



=𝛽



𝑇𝐴

,



+𝛽



∆𝑅𝐸𝑉



−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶



𝑇𝐴

,



+𝛽



𝑃𝑃𝐸



𝑇𝐴

,



+𝛽



𝑅𝑂𝐴



+𝑒



(2)

Where TACC

is the total accruals for sample firm i

for year t; TA

it -1

is the total assets for sample firm i

for year t-1; ΔREV

is the change in revenue for

sample firm i for year t; ΔREC

is the change in

accounts receivable for sample firm i for year t; PPE

is the gross property plant and equipment for sample

firm i for year t; 𝑒

is the error term for sample firm i

for year t.

Finally, discretionary accruals are the result of the

deduction of non-discretionary accruals from

(NDACC) TACC, which are estimated in the

previous model:

𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶



=𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶



−𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶



(3)

2.2.2 Independent Variable (Family Firms)

Studies classify family businesses using different

criteria, such as family ownership over 10% or 20%

of shares (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio & Lang, 2002)

or the presence of two or more family members on the

board (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). This study defines

family firms by the percentage of family ownership

in outstanding shares for a given year.

2.2.3 Control Variables

Firm Size (SIZE): Total assets figure is used as a

proxy for firm size (Ciftci et al., 2019); Leverage

(LEV): Measured by the ratio between total debt and

total assets (Danso et al., 2019); Profitability: Return

on Assets (ROA) is a financial metric that measures a

company's profitability by assessing its ability to

generate earnings from its total assets (Ciftci et al.,

2019); Growth: Sales growth is the percentage

increase or decrease in a company's revenue over a

specific period (Danso et al., 2019); CFO: Cash flow

from operating activities (Danso et al., 2019).

2.3 Empirical Model (s)

AEM =

𝜷

𝟎

𝜷

𝟏

Family_Ownership

𝒊𝒕

𝜷

SIZE

𝜷

LEVERAGE

𝐢𝐭

𝜷

PROFITABILITY

𝐢𝐭

𝜷

GROWTH

𝒊𝒕

𝜷

CFO

𝒊𝒕

𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅

𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔

𝛆

𝐢𝐭

Where Earning management is measured using two

proxies the first proxy suggested by Kothari et al.,

2005. Model. Family controlled firms is measured

using continuations variable based on previous

studies, family businesses are identified 10% cut-off

point (La Porta et al., 1999, Smith and Amoako-Adu,

1999, Faccio and Lang, 2002, Barontini and Caprio,

2006, Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2010, Cabeza-García et al.,

2017, Labelle et al., 2018).

Earnings Management Practices During the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Comparative Study of Jordanian Family and Non-Family Controlled

Firms

253

3 CHAPTER FOUR: DATA

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

3.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for key

variables in the study. Accrual Earnings Management

(AEM) has a mean of approximately -0.013, ranging

from -0.540 to 0.391, with a standard deviation of

0.086. Family Ownership exhibits a mean of about

0.253, varying between 0 and 1.327, and a standard

deviation of 0.257.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

AEM -0.013 0.086 -0.540 0.391

Family Ownership 0.253 0.257 0 1.327

SIZE 9.928 1.441 5.768 14.509

LEVERAGE 0.078 0.115 0 0.631

PROFITABILITY 0.556 8.833 -33.22 31.35

GROWTH 2.069 26.221 -2.026 19.975

CFO 7.069 2.004 0 13.540

3.2 Correlation Analysis

Table 3 presents the correlations between the

independent variables to assess the potential presence

of multicollinearity. The highest correlation is

observed between CFO and SIZE, indicating a strong

positive relationship. However, since this correlation

remains below the commonly accepted 0.80 threshold

(Gujarati & Porter, 2009), there is no evidence of

severe multicollinearity. Furthermore, the VIF values

confirm the absence of multicollinearity among the

independent variables, ensuring the reliability of the

regression analysis (Hair et al., 2010).

3.3 Regression Analysis

The regression analysis in Table 5 examines the

impact of family ownership on earnings management

across two periods: pre-COVID-19 (Model 1) and

during the pandemic (Model 2).

Table 4. Variance Inflation Factor Analysis.

Variable VIF

CFO 2.57

SIZE 2.31

PROFITABILITY 1.32

LEVERAGE 1.06

Famil

Ownershi

1.04

GROWTH 1.01

Mean VIF 1.55

Table 5. Regression Results

Model 1

(Pre Covid-

19)

Model 2

(During

Covid-19)

VARIABLES AEM AEM

Famil

Ownership 0.0215 0.0279*

(0.0198) (0.0145)

SIZE 0.0347*** 0.0347***

(0.00747) (0.00654)

LEVERAGE -0.0655 -0.00632

(0.0714) (0.0297)

PROFITABILITY 0.00264*** 0.00163*

(0.0009) (0.001)

GROWTH -.000 -0.0029

(.000) (0.0090)

CFO -0.0287*** -0.0370***

(0.0062) (0.00431)

Constan

-0.180*** -0.152***

(0.0454) (0.047)

Industr

Dummies Include

Include

Yea

Dummies Include

Include

Observations 117 200

R-square

0.626 0.588

Note: The table presents the results of the regression

analysis examining the correlation between family

ownership and earnings management. Model 1 tests

this association for the period before the COVID-19

outbreak (2015-2018), while Model 2 assesses the

nexus during the COVID-19 pandemic. Standard errors

are robust. Statistical significance levels are denoted by

***, **, and *, indicating 1%, 5%, and 10%

nificance levels, res

ectivel

Table 3. Correlation Matrix.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

AEM 1

Family Ownership 0.0583 1

SIZE -0.0304 -0.2213* 1

LEVERAGE 0.025 -0.0617 0.2153* 1

PROFITABILITY -0.0093 -0.0145 0.3570* -0.0497 1

GROWTH 0.0962* -0.0051 0.001 -0.0096 0.0246 1

CFO -0.3486* -0.0677 0.7372* 0.0821 0.4669* -0.0293 1

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In Model 1 (Pre-COVID-19), the coefficient for

Family Ownership (0.0215, p = 0.198) indicates a

weak, non-significant relationship, suggesting

minimal influence on earnings management in stable

conditions. This aligns with prior research

highlighting the limited impact of family ownership

on earnings quality in normal periods (Ali et al., 2007;

Achleitner et al., 2014).

However, in Model 2 (During COVID-19),

family ownership exhibits a significant positive

relationship with earnings management (0.0279, p <

0.05), indicating increased manipulation during the

crisis. This supports findings that family firms adjust

financial reporting in response to uncertainty (Lai &

Tam, 2020; Liu et al., 2022), likely to preserve their

legacy, reputation, and financing (Chrisman &

Chua, 2011). The stewardship perspective suggests

that family owners leverage financial discretion to

ensure firm survival across generations (Madison et

al., 2016).

Contextual factors may further shape this

relationship. Highly leveraged or expanding family

firms may engage in greater earnings management to

meet covenants and sustain growth (Achleitner et al.,

2014; Liu et al., 2022). Conversely, firm size,

profitability, and strong cash flows may temper

such practices (Pazzaglia et al., 2013; Lai & Tam,

2020). The interaction between socioemotional

wealth, stewardship motives, and crisis conditions

likely influences family firms' reporting strategies

(Chrisman & Chua, 2011; Madison et al., 2016).

Overall, these findings highlight the strategic role

of family ownership in financial reporting,

particularly in uncertain environments. They

underscore the need to consider governance

implications and the motivations behind family

firms’ earnings management practices in

evaluating earnings quality.

4 CONCLUSION

This study examines the impact of family ownership

on earnings management before and during the

COVID-19 pandemic, using non-financial firms

listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (2015–2022).

The sample is divided into pre-pandemic (2015–2018)

and pandemic (2019–2022) periods.

Regression analysis reveals that family ownership

did not significantly influence earnings management

before the pandemic. However, during the crisis,

family firms exhibited a stronger inclination towards

earnings manipulation. This behavior aligns with

socioemotional wealth theory, as family firms seek to

protect their legacy and maintain stakeholder

confidence (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011; Chrisman &

Chua, 2011), while agency theory indicates that

dominant family owners may prioritize their interests

over minority shareholders (Chua et al., 2009). Weak

investor protections in Jordan further facilitate

earnings manipulation (Alzoubi, 2016).

High leverage and growth pressures may have

driven earnings management to meet debt covenants

and expansion goals (Achleitner et al., 2014), while

firm size, profitability, and cash flow strength

potentially mitigated aggressive reporting (Pazzaglia

et al., 2013). These findings highlight the need for

improved governance and oversight of earnings

quality in Jordanian family firms, particularly during

economic downturns.

The study provides critical insights for regulators,

investors, and auditors by emphasizing the role of

concentrated family ownership in shaping financial

reporting practices. Policymakers should strengthen

governance frameworks to curb earnings

manipulation, while investors and analysts should

exercise caution when assessing family firms'

financial performance during crises.

This study focuses on agency and socioemotional

wealth perspectives in the Jordanian context. Future

research should explore variations within family

firms, considering generational differences and

multiple SEW dimensions. Cross-country studies

could provide a comparative analysis of institutional

effects, and incorporating real earnings management

(REM) alongside accrual-based measures would

offer a more comprehensive understanding of

earnings management practices.

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