Coalition Formation for Simulating and Analyzing Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma

Udara Weerakoon

2015

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the strictly competitive iterative version of the non-zero-sum two player game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This was accomplished by simulating the players in a memetic framework. Our primary motivation involves solving the tragedy of the commons problem, a dilemma in which individuals acting selfishly destroy the shared resources of the population. In solving this problem, we identify strategies for applying coalition formation to the spatial distribution of cooperative or defective agents. We use two reinforcement learning methods, temporal difference learning and Q-learning, on the agents in the environment. This overcomes the negative impact of random selection without cooperation between neighbors. Agents of the memetic framework form coalitions in which the leaders make the decisions as a way of improving performance. By imposing a reward and cost schema to the multiagent system, we are able to measure the performance of the individual leader as well as the performance of the organization.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Weerakoon U. (2015). Coalition Formation for Simulating and Analyzing Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma . In Proceedings of the International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 1: ICAART, ISBN 978-989-758-073-4, pages 22-31. DOI: 10.5220/0005199000220031


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icaart15,
author={Udara Weerakoon},
title={Coalition Formation for Simulating and Analyzing Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma},
booktitle={Proceedings of the International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 1: ICAART,},
year={2015},
pages={22-31},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0005199000220031},
isbn={978-989-758-073-4},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 1: ICAART,
TI - Coalition Formation for Simulating and Analyzing Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma
SN - 978-989-758-073-4
AU - Weerakoon U.
PY - 2015
SP - 22
EP - 31
DO - 10.5220/0005199000220031