Boolean Exponent Splitting

Michael Tunstall, Louiza Papachristodoulou, Kostas Papagiannopoulos

2021

Abstract

A typical countermeasure against side-channel attacks consists of masking intermediate values with a random number. In symmetric cryptographic algorithms, Boolean shares of the secret are typically used, whereas in asymmetric algorithms the secret exponent is typically masked using algebraic properties. This paper presents a new exponent splitting technique with minimal impact on performance based on Boolean shares, typically requiring only an extra register and a few register copies per bit. We perform a security evaluation of our algorithms using a mutual information framework and provide proofs that they are secure against first-order side-channel attacks. The side-channel resistance of the proposed algorithms are also practically verified with test vector leakage assessment performed on Xilinx’s Zynq zc702 evaluation board.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Tunstall M., Papachristodoulou L. and Papagiannopoulos K. (2021). Boolean Exponent Splitting. In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, ISBN 978-989-758-524-1, pages 321-332. DOI: 10.5220/0010570903210332

in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt21,
author={Michael Tunstall and Louiza Papachristodoulou and Kostas Papagiannopoulos},
title={Boolean Exponent Splitting},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT,},
year={2021},
pages={321-332},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0010570903210332},
isbn={978-989-758-524-1},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT,
TI - Boolean Exponent Splitting
SN - 978-989-758-524-1
AU - Tunstall M.
AU - Papachristodoulou L.
AU - Papagiannopoulos K.
PY - 2021
SP - 321
EP - 332
DO - 10.5220/0010570903210332