Blind Side Channel on the Elephant LFSR

Awaleh Houssein Meraneh, Christophe Clavier, Hélène Le Bouder, Julien Maillard, Julien Maillard, Gaël Thomas

2022

Abstract

Elephant is a finalist to the NIST lightweight cryptography competition. In this paper, the first theoretical blind side channel attack against the authenticated encryption algorithm Elephant is presented. More precisely, we are targetting the LFSR-based counter used internally. LFSRs are classic functions used in symmetric cryptography. In the case of Elephant, retrieving the initial state of the LFSR is equivalent to retrieving the encryption key. The paper ends by the study of different ways to tweak the design of Elephant to mitigate our attack.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Houssein Meraneh A., Clavier C., Le Bouder H., Maillard J. and Thomas G. (2022). Blind Side Channel on the Elephant LFSR. In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, ISBN 978-989-758-590-6, pages 25-34. DOI: 10.5220/0011135300003283

in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt22,
author={Awaleh Houssein Meraneh and Christophe Clavier and Hélène Le Bouder and Julien Maillard and Gaël Thomas},
title={Blind Side Channel on the Elephant LFSR},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT,},
year={2022},
pages={25-34},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0011135300003283},
isbn={978-989-758-590-6},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT,
TI - Blind Side Channel on the Elephant LFSR
SN - 978-989-758-590-6
AU - Houssein Meraneh A.
AU - Clavier C.
AU - Le Bouder H.
AU - Maillard J.
AU - Thomas G.
PY - 2022
SP - 25
EP - 34
DO - 10.5220/0011135300003283