Tuning of the Update Timing Will Stop the Defector Invasion in the Spatial Game Theory

Akihiro Takahara, Tomoko Sakiyama

2023

Abstract

Since the defectors tend to survive in the Spatial prisoner’s dilemma, many studies have proposed models for the purpose of survivals of cooperators. But many of those models are not realistic. Therefore, in this study, we proposed a model that considered the player’s decision-making time based on previous research. In the proposed model, the defectors decrease the probability of the strategy update while the cooperators increase the probability of the strategy update. In this paper, we investigate the defector density and the spatial distribution by setting two different system sizes: 50×50 and 200×200. Since the results were very similar to each system size, we found that the proposal model was not affected by the system size. Furthermore, ever if the payoff parameter regarding a defector vs. a cooperator increased, the defector density did not increase rapidly, which was against the conventional model. We compared the spatial distribution of the proposal model with the conventional model and found that cooperators were widely maintained in the proposal model while they were partially maintained in the conventional model. Thus, the proposed model that introduces decision-making times of players is a realistic model and contributes to the survival of cooperators.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Takahara A. and Sakiyama T. (2023). Tuning of the Update Timing Will Stop the Defector Invasion in the Spatial Game Theory. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Complexity, Future Information Systems and Risk - Volume 1: COMPLEXIS, ISBN 978-989-758-644-6, SciTePress, pages 13-16. DOI: 10.5220/0011716200003485

in Bibtex Style

@conference{complexis23,
author={Akihiro Takahara and Tomoko Sakiyama},
title={Tuning of the Update Timing Will Stop the Defector Invasion in the Spatial Game Theory},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Complexity, Future Information Systems and Risk - Volume 1: COMPLEXIS,},
year={2023},
pages={13-16},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0011716200003485},
isbn={978-989-758-644-6},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Complexity, Future Information Systems and Risk - Volume 1: COMPLEXIS,
TI - Tuning of the Update Timing Will Stop the Defector Invasion in the Spatial Game Theory
SN - 978-989-758-644-6
AU - Takahara A.
AU - Sakiyama T.
PY - 2023
SP - 13
EP - 16
DO - 10.5220/0011716200003485
PB - SciTePress