Strategy-Proofness and Non-Obvious Manipulability of Top-Trading-Cycles with Strategic Invitations

Shinnosuke Hamasaki, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

2025

Abstract

Diffusion mechanism design is one of the recent trends in the literature of mechanism design. Its purpose is to incentivize agents to diffuse the information about the mechanism to as many followers as possible, as well as reporting their preferences. This paper is the first attempt to consider diffusion mechanism design for two-sided matching from the perspective of non-obvious manipulability. We focus on the top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism for the many-to-one two-sided matching problem. We clarify the necessary and sufficient condition for the mechanism to satisfy strategy-proofness and non-obvious manipulability, respectively. We also propose a new TTC-based matching mechanism that violates strategy-proofness but satisfies non-obvious manipulability, which illustrates how we can handle strategic information diffusion in two-sided matching.

Paper Citation

in Harvard Style

Hamasaki S., Todo T. and Yokoo M. (2025). Strategy-Proofness and Non-Obvious Manipulability of Top-Trading-Cycles with Strategic Invitations. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 1: ICAART; ISBN 978-989-758-737-5, SciTePress, pages 616-623. DOI: 10.5220/0013319100003890

in Bibtex Style

@conference{icaart25,
author={Shinnosuke Hamasaki and Taiki Todo and Makoto Yokoo},
title={Strategy-Proofness and Non-Obvious Manipulability of Top-Trading-Cycles with Strategic Invitations},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 1: ICAART},
year={2025},
pages={616-623},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0013319100003890},
isbn={978-989-758-737-5},
}

in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 1: ICAART
TI - Strategy-Proofness and Non-Obvious Manipulability of Top-Trading-Cycles with Strategic Invitations
SN - 978-989-758-737-5
AU - Hamasaki S.
AU - Todo T.
AU - Yokoo M.
PY - 2025
SP - 616
EP - 623
DO - 10.5220/0013319100003890
PB - SciTePress